Journal on Baltic Security, 2018; 4(2): 1–13 Research Article Open Access Viljar Veebel*, Illimar Ploom Estonia’s comprehensive approach to national defence: origins and dilemmas Open Access. © 2018 Viljar Veebel, Illimar Ploom, published by Sciendo. s 4.0 License. This work is licensed under the Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 License. https://doi.org/10.2478/jobs-2018-0007 received November 9, 2018; accepted November 11, 2018. Abstract: This study aimed to offer an in-depth insight into intellectual dilemmas associated with a comprehensive approach to national defence using Estonia as an example to demonstrate that comprehensive approach in itself may not be enough to feel safe and secure. The authors focused on two specific theoretical questions. First, how security threats are determined in Estonia, including the impact of such a phenomenon as macro-securitization? Second, how various levels of comprehensive approach relate to each other in the way that a shared security culture will be created? In this way, the aim of this article was not only to shake the foundations of national defence in Estonia but also to contribute to the improvement of the current model to ensure that it actually works in practice. Keywords: Comprehensive security; Estonia; resilience. 1 Introduction Next to the promotion of international security cooperation, a comprehensive approach to national defence,1 based on resilience and deterrence, is regarded as one of the essential foundations of Estonia’s defence policy. Since Estonia’s national defence strategy stipulates that national defence can no longer be limited to military defence alone, military forces shall be combined with non-military capabilities. National defence and the corresponding preparations are con- sidered to be the tasks of many different institutions and people from the public and private sectors, including civil society (National Defence Strategy, 2011, 2017). The emergence of Estonia’s comprehensive approach is perhaps best visible when comparing the last two National Security Concepts where the concurrence of security areas with ministerial division of responsibilities has been replaced by a wide task-based approach (National Security Concept 2010, 2017). The 2017 National Security Concept also introduces for the first time the concept of resilience which surfaces prominently throughout the document and is elaborated in a separate sub-chapter (National Security Concept 2017). The two key concepts that the security and defence policy documents of Estonia rely on are whole of government and whole of society (National Security Concept 2017, 2), bringing together the two essential elements of the comprehensive approach paradigm and the idea of resilience. It is important to realize that these new conceptual imports are relatively well received by the society. The idea that national defence should be a joint task of the entire society is also highly supported in Estonia – according to the recent public opinion survey from March 2018; 78% of the respondents approve this view and only 6% oppose it (Kivirähk, 2018). Therefore, the expectations of Estonians are running high with regard to comprehensive national defence model, thereby demonstrating also the volitional resilience of the bulk of the population. As will be argued, such a high support for national defence can be read as a result of securitization. Thus, 1 Hereby terminologically referring to the most commonly used explanation of comprehensive approach as a “coordination or interaction between various actors and organisations with the aim of generating coherent policy and action during periods of crises or disaster or in a post-conflict environment” (see, e.g. Hull, 2011, p. 5). *Corresponding author: Viljar Veebel, Baltic Defence College, Tartu, Estonia, E-mail: viljar.veebel@ut.ee Illimar Ploom: Estonian National Defence College Unauthenticated Download Date | 2/7/19 8:54 AM