African Journal of Science and Research ,2013, 2(6):27-36 ISSN: 2306-5877 Available Online: http://ajsr.rstpublishers.com/ MECHANISMS OF THE GOVERNANCE IN MICRO-FINANCE AND THE RATE OF REIMBURSEMENT:EMPIRICAL APPLICATION TO THE TUNISIAN CASE. Zouhayer Mighri* 1 and Anis Jarboui 2 1)Faculty of Economics and Management, University of Sfax-Tunisia. 2) Higher Institute of Business Administration (ISAAS), University of Sfax, Sfax-Tunisia. E-mail: znl20099@yahoo.fr Received:16, Nov,2013 Accepted: 27,Dec,2013. Abstract This paper to address the central issue on the main governance mechanisms for achieving the financial performance in the microfinance sector.Firstly it is attempted, to understand the different mechanisms of governance of microfinance institutions previously analyzed by the literature. Then, we will present our methodology and our fundamental assumptions. Finally we will try to locate and diagnose the main mechanisms which are expected to have a positive impact on the rate of reimbursement and that, in the specific case of Tunisia. Keywords: Lack of reimbursement, microfinance, Mechanisms of the governance and Tunisia. INTRODUCTION The majority of the studies (Campion and Frankiewicz, 1999; Rock and al., 2001;Clarkson and Deck, 1997) who were focused on the governance of company in the sector of the MI are compared to reports of consultancy and hot lines on the manner of regulating the sector. These studies show many difficulties of apprehending the significant mechanisms and insofar as those which are recommended in the hot lines of the sector are often of no importance. In other words, the challenges to take up as regards governance of the ordinary companies on mature markets are thus simply transposed to the sector of the microfinance and are often supported by a little developed theoretical framework. Indeed, the recent studies of Mersland and Strøm (2009a) and Hartarska (2005) showed that the best mechanisms of governance for the companies on mature markets generally have little influence in microfinance. According to this vision, a different and more specific approach is necessary in order to better conceive and to apprehend the system of governance in the sector of MI. In other words it is necessary to exceed the traditional theory of the agency and the theories insisting only on better practices of management of the board of directors in this sector. In fact, the question of the governance in microfinance arises from the side of the three fundamental axes to knowing the capacity, the transparency and the participation of the fascinating parts which can be regarded as relevant for the MI. Moreover, the mechanisms of governance can be given in an internal way by the MI itself (councils, audits, characteristics and incentives of the general manager, etc…) or in an external way (thanks to the competition of the market, the regulations public, etc…). We are interested mainly in the supervision, the notation and the audit like external mechanisms of governance, with the composition of the board of directors (size of the council and independence of the council), the methodology of credit, and finally the legal statute and the presence of institutional like variables of property. The organizational form of the MI is retained like variable of contingency of the governance. The role of the board of directors in the financial and social performances. In comparison with the growing number of the challenges of the governance in the sector of microfinance which vary according to the type of institution and the structure of property, one can consider that there is a diversity of mechanisms of governance. Nevertheless, the attention is often allotted to the crucial role of board of directors (BD) in the specific case of the organizations of social economy in general and the microfinance institutions (MFI) in particular. Indeed, certain mechanisms which function naturally in companies can be partially or completely non-existent within the framework of the MFI (Labie, 2005).Under these conditions, BD proves to be paramount, because it forms the natural plug between the leader-managers of the MFI and the external interests. Any organization must be directed to achieve the goal which it set. This is why, an optimal distribution of the decisional capacity and supervisory powers are thus conceded, in a formal or abstract way, with individuals, groups of individuals or authorities. By opposition, the concentration of the capacity between the hands of only one person or a group of people inside a MI could lead to harmful drifts. In other words, the dysfunctions observed within certain MI, such as the confiscation of the capacity to serve the individual interests as well as the conflicts between elected officials and employee-experts, can cause their failure. This report translates the relevant role of the BD like effective mechanism of governance of the MFI. In fact, the institution of microfinance knew many problems under the effect of a pyramidal and bureaucratic organizational structure, which was based on bad incentives in connection with the personnel who is slightly controlled by the board of directors (Austin, Gutierrez, Labie and Ogliastri, 1998). Composition of the board of directors The BD was often regarded as the essential node which connects all these actors to the governance. At this level, the MFI must be in measurement that each new member of BD has the necessary means to include/understand and carry out at the same time his financial and social responsibilities. At this term, the president of the council must be a qualified element and ready to manage the meetings by centering the agenda on the broad questions and policy. The president must be also able to direct actions and to create a consensus among the administrators by reducing the frequent divergences of opinion. Moreover, with an aim of avoiding the passive engagement of the