Journal of Common Market Studies Volume 31, No. 1 March 1993 zy Legislator Shirking and Voter Monitoring: Impacts of European Parliament Electoral Systems upon Legislator-Voter Relationships SHAUN BOWLER zyxwvu University zyxwvu of California Riverside and DAVID M. FARRELL* University of Manchester Introduction Questions about the ‘democratic deficit’ in the European Community are generally dressed up in traditional terms on the relativity of power between the tri-partite branches of government. In particular, attention has focused on the executive-legislative dimension, and on the supposed zero-sum game between the Council and the Commission, on the weakness of the European Parliament vis-ci-vis the other institutions. The thesis is developed that as the EC’s influence over the Member States increases, there is aneed to protect the ‘democratic’ (i.e. legislative) check on executive power. While such an argument is something of a simplification, given the complexity of European institutional relationships, it is not, however, one without force among certain groups. Those against the *We would like to acknowledge the financial support of the Commission of the European Community (DGX), the Center for German and European Studies, University of California at Berkeley, the University of California. Riverside and the School of European Studies, University of Wales, Cardiff. We are also very grateful to Simon Bulmer and the two anonymous referees for their helpful comments. 0 Basil Blackwell Ltd 1991, 10X zyxwvutsr Cowley Road, Oxford OX4 IJF, UK and 23X Main Street, Cambridge MA 02142, USA