Towards a minimalist definition of the plot Brenda Case Scheer, College of Architecture and Planning, University of Utah, Salt Lake City, UT 84012, USA. E-mail: scheer@arch.utah.edu Throughout my time working with ISUF (since 1997) I have slowly come to recognize the need for a minimalist definition of the elements of urban form. As we expand the field of concern to the entire urban world, it is clear that the kinds of definition of form elements that are particular to a region ─ such as Conzen’s ‘plot head’ or Caniggia’s ‘matrix route’─ cannot serve as universal descriptions. Even more radically, I have come to discard the notion that the urban elements are always defined relative to each other. Rather, I see the elements of form as data points, without the relationships to other elements and uses that are so culturally varied that they cannot serve as universal touchstones. These data points describe what is on the ground, while the cultural variations are the conditions under which elements are created and change. This is why I regard Karl Kropf’s thorough and necessary analysis, ‘Plots, property and behaviour’ (Kropf, 2018), as a breakthrough first step to the goal of a minimal definition. In analysing the plot’s common association with control or use, that is, its role as defining property, Kropf identifies many cultural and physical variations. He illustrates why those variations make it impossible to have a universal definition of the plot that is tied to the idea of property. This profound observation is critical because it untethers the definition of the plot from temporary and sometimes conflicting physical indicators, such as fences, and also the particulars of any one idea of property (for example, a plot being defined as something you own). But then Kropf swerves and ties it instead to the idea of behaviour, as in the ‘plot boundaries are a socially agreed set of spatial limits on behaviour’ (Kropf, p.14). Kropf has done all the work to clear out the false starts ─ plot as property or land use or that which is inside the fence ─ and now it is time to bring the baton even closer to home. His definition still presupposes that plots must contain the idea of the relationship between form and human behaviour. But if we are to be consistent between one kind of element and another, we need to apply this same idea to built form (buildings, structures, objects). I think we can agree, based on Kropf’s voluminous work in this area, that built form is not defined by its relationship to humans (ownership, land use, control), and therefore I think we need to agree that it is also not defined by the behaviour of its occupants, owners, designers or anyone else. Morphologists define a building by its physicality: I can see it, feel it and measure it. I do not need to know who owns it or what it does or what it means to represent it in my data on the morphology of a place. Kropf (p. 5) requires definitions to be consistent, specific, general, comprehensive, and coherent. My own minimum requirements for the definition of elements of form are that they are universal (exist in all settled places), measurable, objective (not subjective), and co-existent, as well as differentiated from each other (Scheer, 2016, pp. 126-7). To be consistent, the definitions of plot and buildings ─ or more broadly, plots and built form ─ should be similar. This requires that we go one step further toward the goal of consistency, universality, generality, objectivity, and coherence. Detaching the human related attributes allows us to see the plot or the building for what it is, morphologically: a data point consisting only of its measurements, its location, its temporality, its status (man- made), and its classification (a plot as distinct from a building). Thus, a minimal definition of built form is that (1) it is manmade, (2) it is solid and measurable in dimensional units and (3) it is specifically located and immobile, now or in the past. This definition does not include any attributes of ownership, use, behaviour, legal standing, or control as part of the definition. It also does not include any positional relationship to other elements of form (such as plots, blocks, or regions) because these relationships are not universal. To be consistent, the definition of plot should be just as minimal. Therefore, I propose that the plot is (1) man- made, as land is claimed, (2) a piece of land bounded by measurable, geographically-defined vectors, and (3) specifically located in the world now or in the past ─ not, for example, an ambiguous territory claimed by a tribe or a lion king. With this definition, the plot has no ‘meaning’ per se, but is imbued with meaning by those who create it or use it, just as buildings have a myriad of cultural and economic attributes and meanings. To attach and compare cultural meaning to artifacts like plots, streets, blocks, and buildings, is to analyse the data (the objectively existing artifacts) through infinite lenses of human or natural relationships. Along with identifying patterns in the data, these analyses