Center for Security Studies The Illusion of European ‘Neutrality’ in Asia 6 Oct 2014 By Hans Kundnani, Michito Tsuruoka for European Geostrategy Why is Europe’s ‘neutrality’ towards a host of Asian political and security issues unsustainable? Hans Kundnani and Michito Tsuruoka’s five-part answer reminds us that economic policies do indeed have political and security consequences, that neutrality doesn’t necessarily shield you from conflict, and more. This article was originallypublished by European Geostrategy on 25 September 2014. In the future, Europeans are likely to face some difficult choices in Asia. They are becoming increasingly dependent on trade with Asia, which includes some of the fastest growing economies in the world. But it is also a region in which there are a number of territorial and maritime disputes – in particular between China and its neighbours – and even discussion about a new arms race. This makes the question of what role Europeans should play in Asian security an increasingly urgent one. In fact, the kind of power the European Union (EU) is in the twenty-first century, and the way it is perceived by other powers around the world, may be determined to a significant extent by the way it responds to Asian security. The instinct of many Europeans is to retain ‘neutrality’, or to avoid ‘taking sides’, in Asia. Some argue that, although Europeans may have increasing economic interests in Asia, they do not have any substantial stakes in faraway conflicts between various Asian countries over apparently insignificant rocks, shoals and reefs, or even in the emerging strategic competition between China and the United States. They say that, although war in Asia would be disastrous for Europeans in economic terms, there is little that they can or should do about it. Thus Europeans are ‘neutral’ by default, because they do not have the means to be a real player in political and security relations in Asia. Others, however, believe that European integration can function as an inspiration or even a model for Asia. Some even think Europeans could play some kind of role in mediating between the parties in disputes about territory and other issues. They argue that, to boost Europeans’ chances of success in those roles, they should remain ‘neutral’ on the thorny issues facing the region. In other words, they see Europeans’ ‘neutrality’ as an asset. The reality is that few in Asia expect Europeans to play a direct military role in any conflict – though the United Kingdom (UK) could be involved more than other EU Member States because of its intelligence sharing arrangements with Australia and the United States through the so-called ‘Five Eyes’ and its security commitment to Australia, Malaysia, New Zealand and Singapore through the Five Power Defence Arrangements. As permanent members of the United Nations Security Council, the UK and France would also inevitably play some role in the event of a military conflict in Asia. However, the argument that Europeans should be ‘neutral’ goes beyond a simple refusal to provide military assistance to Asian powers. The more significant and potentially problematic implication of the idea of European ‘neutrality’ is that Europeans should avoid taking a diplomatic stand by criticising one side or another or by actively supporting one side even in non-military terms. For at least five reasons this idea of European ‘neutrality’ in Asia is an illusion: Europe’s economic decisions have political and security implications: because of their sheer size as an economic power, Europeans cannot escape the reality that their decisions and actions have political and security and other implications. A case in point is the EU’s embargo on selling arms to China. In the mid-2000s, Europeans dealt with the embargo mainly as an economic matter: although some wanted to lift it, it was not because they