PHILOSOPHICAL CONCEPTS IN CONSTRUCTIVISM 348 CONSTRUCTIVIST FOUNDATIONs vol. 13, N°3 Conflating the Concept with the Thing Itay Shani Sun Yat Sen University, China ishani479/at/hotmail.com > Upshot • Kastrup’s attempt to un- dermine the dichotomy between mind and matter is interesting but it leaves much to be desired. In particular, it suf- fers from the following three difcul- ties. First, it is predicated on a misguided working defnition of dichotomy. Sec- ond, it conflates the concept of matter with the putative denotation of that concept. Lastly, it efectively presupposes the refutation of materialism, making it pointless to argue (as he does) that materialism is epistemically more costly than idealism. « 1 » In this ambitious target article Bernardo Kastrup attempts to undermine the dichotomy between mind and mat- ter and, correspondingly, between ideal- ism and materialism. More specifcally, his argument is meant to establish two major points. First, that idealism and material- ism are not, epistemically speaking, on par since the latter, but not the former, necessi- tates abstractions that transcend all possible experience. Second, and consequently, that while materialism is burdened with a hard problem of consciousness there is no analo- gous “hard problem of matter” to encumber idealism. Ultimately, his conclusion is that reductive materialism is epistemically more costly than reductive idealism, making it the lesser alternative of the two. « 2 » Te thrust of Kastrup’s argument refects a familiar line of reasoning within metaphysical idealism – beginning with Berkeley and reaching its apex in Post-Kan- tian idealism – which strives to derive ontic conclusions from epistemic considerations. Much ink, both critical and supportive, was spent on debating the strengths and weak- nesses of such epistemic arguments in favor of idealism (see, e.g., Ewing 1934: chap. II), and it is unfortunate that Kastrup shows little awareness of this relevant history. More regrettable, however, is the worry that although Kastrup is exploring a fascinat- ing terrain, and although there is defnitely something to be said in favor of linking the abstractions involved in the concept of matter to the difculties facing material- ism (a theme that was explored in detail by eminent philosophers such as Bergson and Whitehead), the logic of his argument is rife with lacunae. In what follows I focus on what I take to be the most serious of these. But frst, a few more words about the gist of Kastrup’s argument. « 3 » At the heart of Kastrup’s target article are the following two claims. First, that mind and matter are epistemically non- symmetrical and therefore that they do not constitute a dichotomous pair. Second, that mind is the concrete ground for the abstrac- tion identifed as “matter.” In an important sense the second claim is the more basic of the two since it is this alleged non-symmet- rical dependence of matter on the abstract- ing activities of mind that enables Kastrup to undermine the presumed dichotomy between mind and matter. He then goes on to argue that in the absence of such a di- chotomy one cannot conclude that idealism sufers from a “hard problem of matter” par- allel to the hard problem of consciousness aficting orthodox materialism. Moreover, using the crucial assumption that matter is ultimately an abstraction of mind, Kastrup proceeds to argue that while mind cannot be reduced to matter (as per the hard problem of consciousness), matter is, in principle, reducible to mind. Tis brings him to the conclusion that materialism is epistemically more costly than idealism, tilting the bal- ance in favor of the latter. « 4 » Ironically, the most formidable difculty in Kastrup’s argument is a well- known problem in the history of philoso- phy, one which had had a devastating ef- fect on the fate of idealism in 20th century philosophy. As mentioned, Kastrup’s entire argument is founded upon the assertion that matter is an abstraction of mind. Te justifcation for this controversial claim is based on the assumption that we arrive at the concept of an experience-transcending matter as a result of the abstracting faculties of consciousness. However, the obvious re- sponse to this type of argument is to insist that while the concept of matter is contingent upon the constructive activities of mind, in no way does this prove that the denotation of the concept – namely, matter itself, should it exist – is thereby contingent upon such acts. It seems a logical fallacy to conclude that matter itself is mind-dependent simply because such is the predicament of the con- cept of matter. Tis was the main point of a highly infuential critique of idealism (in particular Berkeley’s) due to George Edward Moore (1903) and Bertrand Russell (1974) and it is bewildering that Kastrup appears oblivious to the challenge. « 5 » For this reason, nor is the analogy between the mind-matter relation and the Open Peer Commentaries on Bernardo Kastrup’s “Conflating Abstraction with Empirical Observation: The False Mind-Matter Dichotomy”