adds the needed human dimension, showing the frus- tration of pursuing often vague goals with no clear in- dication of success while paying the price in blood. I highly recommend this book to soldiers, scholars, and the general reader who wants to understand why, to this day, there is no clear consensus as to exactly how or why we failed in Vietnam. PETER S. KINDSVATTER Independent Scholar LOUISE BARNETT. Atrocity and American Military Justice in Southeast Asia: Trial by Army. (Routledge Studies in the Modern History of Asia, number 64.) New York: Routledge. 2010. Pp. xiii, 278. $130.00. This is a painful but necessary read. Based on archives and published documents from judicial inquiries, Sen- ate hearings, and military court trials, the author brings out in excruciating detail some of the atrocities perpe- trated by American soldiers in the Philippines (1899– 1902), Japanese defenders of Manila (1945), and Amer- ican GIs in Vietnam (1968–1969). Louise Barnett also mentions recent incidents in Iraq and Afghanistan. Barnett emphasizes continuity rather than change. She sees a pattern of atrocious behavior that repeats itself whenever three conditions are met. First, the mil- itary institution forms a culture of its own based on hi- erarchical loyalty and horizontal solidarity among sol- diers with a shared combat experience. Internal loyalties become more important than externally im- posed humanitarian principles. Second, the soldiers op- erate in a foreign country with a culture and language different from their own. They find it difficult to dis- tinguish between enemies and friends, and thus have a tendency to fear and loath the whole population as “gu- gus” or “gooks.” Third, commanders do not take seri- ously their obligation to make subordinates observe jus in bello; officers give ambiguous orders or do not have sufficient control of their subordinates. Because these three conditions have been met in many of America’s wars, atrocities have become almost inevitable. So too has the tendency for the military hi- erarchy to cover up whenever there is a risk that atroc- ities may be disclosed, and to ensure minimal punish- ment for as few as possible of the perpetrators. Barnett’s account is full of pitiful, mediocre men, some of whom have made illustrious military careers in spite of having tortured or executed prisoners, women, and children in the places where they served. Barnett heaps scorn on these men by citing and analyzing the many ways they tried to avoid responsibility and cover their backs when testifying before a tribunal. The two main villains in the account are Edwin Forbes Glenn (1857–1926) and Douglas MacArthur (1880–1964). The only real hero of the story is Mac- Arthur’s nemesis, Tomoyuki Yamashita (1885–1946), whom Barnett describes with utmost respect. Ya- mashita was given command of the Japanese forces in the Philippines in October 1944, just before MacAr- thur’s landing in Leyte, too late and with too few means of transportation to organize an effective defense. He tried to spare the population of Manila by ordering its evacuation, but MacArthur did not leave any exit route open. A Japanese naval commander decided to defy Yamashita’s orders and defend Manila to the end. Knowing they would soon die, the Japanese soldiers committed heinous crimes against the local population, who were caught between the entrenched Japanese and the approaching U.S. military. Some 100,000 people died. Yamashita did his best to prevent this from hap- pening. Yet, he was considered responsible and quickly sentenced to death by an American military commis- sion, and hanged in February 1946. If the “Yamashita standard” had been applied to the U.S. Army itself, then American commanders would also have hanged. Responsibility for My Lai would have been placed not only on the shoulders of William Calley but also on those who instituted the body count as a measure of military success. Barnett is deeply knowledgeable about the material in the book. She has used a wealth of archival and pub- lished sources. Yet, in a strict sense this is not a his- torical account, but rather a comparative analysis of military justice in three different circumstances. The emphasis is not on the historical circumstances but on patterns repeating themselves. Much is made of the similarity between the war in the Philippines and the Vietnam War. One obviously significant common factor is mostly overlooked: guerrilla tactics. Most of the atrocities described were made in direct response to at- tacks by forces who did not wear uniforms. The com- batants hid among the local population and relied on its support. The atrocities described in the Philippines happened in response to a surprise attack by guerrillas at Balangiga that killed a number of U.S. soldiers while they were having their breakfast. The Japanese troops in the Philippines also faced guerrillas. My Lai hap- pened in the aftermath of the Tet offensive. Guerrillas aim to prevent any bonding between foreign occupants and locals. The surest way to realize this aim is to pro- voke the foreigners in ways that lead them to commit atrocities. Similarly, the surest way for an army of oc- cupation to undermine its mission and reputation is to allow atrocities to happen. This is what Barnett calls “the McKinley doctrine,” with reference to the presi- dent’s speech about the Philippines on December 21, 1898. Although it has been systematically violated since then, the doctrine still holds. Barnett’s study should be required reading at every military academy. STEIN TØNNESSON Uppsala University DAVID ZIERLER. The Invention of Ecocide: Agent Orange, Vietnam, and the Scientists Who Changed the Way We Think about the Environment. Athens: University of Georgia Press. 2011. Pp. xii, 245. Cloth $59.95, paper $24.95. Canada and the United States 895 AMERICAN HISTORICAL REVIEW JUNE 2012