Stop Helping Me: When Nuclear Assistance Impedes Nuclear Programs Alexander H. Montgomery Assistant Professor of Political Science, Reed College, Portland, OR. DRAFT 2010-08-15, do not cite without permission. Comments to ahm@reed.edu. Introduction Until recently, theories of how different factors influence the supply of nuclear technologies have not been as well developed as theories of demand for nuclear weapons. For example, most quantitative studies of nuclear weapons development have used indicators that reflected national resources without including technology transfers from other states. 1 Part of this lack of attention to nuclear technology transfer may be due to the perception that many of the initial nuclear weapons programs attempted to rely on primarily internal, domestic sources of knowledge, technology, and resources for fissile material production and were thus structured as top-down “hierarchies.” More recent programs, however, have relied on imports of all three components either in an attempt to cut development times or simply because one or more of these necessary components were not available domestically. 2 With these later nuclear aspirants, domestic capabilities and direct assistance or international proliferation networks were combined to create a supply of nuclear technologies. Recent nuclear programs thus are structured more like networks than hierarchies, although the technical characteristics of nuclear proliferation and the nonproliferation regime have prevented a full-blown market from arising. 3 Publications have lamented the A.Q. Khan network and its deleterious effects on proliferation, emphasizing its clandestine nature and effectiveness and predicting an ominous end to existing nuclear nonproliferation institutions. 4 Recent, more level-headed work by Fuhrmann (2008, 2009b, 2009a) and Kroenig (2009b, 2009a, 2010) has attempted to tackle both the causes and effects of the supply of both sensitive and peaceful nuclear technologies. The bargain of the nonproliferation regime seems to also be broken: Kroenig finds that sensitive nuclear assistance is more likely to be given by states in the Nuclear Suppliers Group (although NPT members are less likely to do so), and Fuhrmann finds that peaceful nuclear cooperation is less likely to be given to states that are part of the NPT. Kroenig argues, simply enough, that countries who receive sensitive nuclear assistance—that is, technologies that are necessary for the construction of a nuclear weapons arsenal, including uranium enrichment, plutonium reprocessing, and nuclear-weapons designs—are more likely to start nuclear programs and acquire weapons. Fuhrmann argues that there are several pathways through which civilian nuclear assistance can affect proliferation, including acquisition of dual- use technology and knowledge and the creation of bureaucratic interests. Their quantitative 1 Kegley 1980, Meyer 1984, Singh and Way 2004, Jo and Gartzke 2007. 2 See Braun and Chyba 2004 for an excellent overview of proliferation rings, and Montgomery 2005 on dismantling nuclear networks. 3 On the market/hierarchy distinction, see Williamson 1985; on network forms of transactions, see Powell 1990, Podolny and Page 1998. On the relationship between the transaction types and proliferation, see Montgomery 2008. 4 This literature is exemplified by Langewiesche 2007; for an incisive critique, see Bunn 2007.