Comparative Politics, forthcoming 1 Threat Perception and Democratic Support in Post-Arab Spring Egypt Shimaa Hatab 1 Abstract The article examines the reasons why Egyptian elites and masses withdrew their support for democracy only two years after they staged mass protests calling for regime change in 2011. I draw on basic tenets of bounded rationality and recent advances within the field of cognitive heuristics to demonstrate how cues generated from domestic and regional developments triggered stronger demands for security and stability. Drawing on elite interviews and public opinion surveys, I show how both elites and the masses paid special attention to intense and vivid events which then prompted a demand for the strong man model. Fear of Islamists pushed both elites and masses to update their preferences, seek refuge in old regime bargains, and reinstate authoritarianism. Introduction Eight years after the outbreak of the Arab uprisings, it is becoming clear that the wave of democratic aspirations that swept through several Arab countries in 2011 is still far from achieving pluralistic systems. For decades, the Arab World stood out as an authoritarian exception defying multiple waves of democratization in other areas of the globe. Presently, the region presents a puzzling case of numerous stumbling transitions. Most of the Arab countries that experienced protests in and around 2011 have since then seen either the restoration or continuation of the same old governing formulas of centralized, non- participatory decision-making, ineffective party systems, accompanied in some cases by civil wars. It is not only that the outcomes have diverged from initial aspirations but—perhaps more importantly—public attitudes and elite preferences toward the scope, speed, and even direction of change expressed in 2011 have reversed. Explanations for this outcome tend to emphasize structural and cultural factors to account for the democratic deficit in the Arab World. Modernization theory and cultural studies highlight the importance of economic development, high levels of education, and a reservoir of civic orientations and normative commitment to democracy for transitions to succeed. i Other “monolithic politico-cultural” explanations point to the alleged incompatibility of the Islamic religion and liberal democracy. These approaches, however, do not offer a satisfactory answer to the contradictory political behavior of the masses. ii Namely, why is it that mass mobilization can at one moment in time be broadly democratic (in 2011– 2012) but then prioritize security over democracy only a few months thereafter? Such a shift 1 Political Science Department, Cairo University; Visiting Fulbright Scholar at Stanford University. Email: seihat@feps.edu.eg & shatab@stanford.edu