Economics & Politics. 2019;00:1–26. wileyonlinelibrary.com/journal/ecpo | 1 © 2019 John Wiley & Sons Ltd Received: 23 November 2017 | Revised: 20 February 2019 | Accepted: 20 May 2019 DOI: 10.1111/ecpo.12137 ORIGINAL ARTICLE Political corruption and capture of the minority* Pierpaolo Giannoccolo 1 | Maurizio Lisciandra 2 *We are thankful for the helpful comments by the participants at the seminars of the Annual Conference of the Italian Economic Association in Naples, the Annual Conference of the European Association of Law and Economics in Vienna, the Annual Conference of the Italian Society of Law and Economics in Rome, and the CICSE lectures in Naples. The authors have equally contributed to each section of the paper. Maurizio Lisciandra dedicates this paper to the memory of his dear friend and coauthor Pierpaolo Giannoccolo, who suddenly passed away during the revision process. The usual disclaimer applies. 1 Department of Economics (DSE),  University of Bologna, Bologna, Italy 2 Department of Economics,  University of Messina, Messina, Italy Correspondence Maurizio Lisciandra, Department of Economics, University of Messina, Piazza Pugliatti 1, 98122, Messina, Italy. Email: mlisciandra@unime.it Abstract This article presents a model of political corruption in which a briber can choose either to bribe only the incumbent party or to capture also the opposition party to sterilize its moni- toring role. The analysis also explores interparty collusion, media independence, and political contestability. The model suggests that policies aiming to strengthen the role of minori- ties can produce ambiguous effects as they may induce brib- ers’ avoidance behavior. Reputational sanctions appear to be less effective than criminal ones, although political contest- ability increases their deterrence effect. Paradoxically, harsh criminal sanctions may induce tacit collusion because mi- norities highly regard their outcomes once in power. KEYWORDS anti‐corruption, bribing, hierarchies, political parties, voters JEL CLASSIFICATION D72; D73; K42 1 | INTRODUCTION The following analysis builds on the several cases of political corruption in which the unlawful con- duct of private individuals, groups, or firms affects the decision‐making process of state institutions. The distinctive trait of political corruption is the improper cooperation between private actors and