International Encyclopedia of Ethics. Edited by Hugh LaFollette. © 2019 John Wiley & Sons Ltd. Published 2019 by John Wiley & Sons Ltd. DOI: 10.1002/9781444367072.wbiee280.pub2 1 Corruption Seumas Miller While there is a vast literature on the topic of corruption (Heidenheimer and Johnston 2002; Hopkin 2002; Dobos et al. 2011; Rothstein and Varraich 2017) that addresses its causes and consequences (Rose‐Ackerman 1999; Sandel 2012) and the means to combat it (Pope 1997; Klitgaard et al. 2000; Preston and Sampford 2002; Lambsdorff 2007; Alexandra and Miller 2010; Johnston 2014; Lessig 2011; Miller 2017; see also ring of gyges; whistleblowing), there is also a paucity of devel- oped theoretical accounts of the concept of corruption. This is presumably due in part to the fact that conceptual analysis tends to be the preserve of philosophy and – historical figures such as Plato (The Republic), Machiavelli (The Prince), and Montesquieu (The Laws) aside – until recently few philosophers have focused on corruption. (But see Thompson 1995, 2013; Miller et al. 2005; Lessig 2011, 2013; Miller 2017.) Moreover, many of the available accounts of corruption are really only brief definitions rather than theoretical accounts. As such, they do not offer the kind of illumination provided by an adequate, full‐blown theoretical exposition. Further, many of these definitions are in terms of the abuse of power or authority (see power) carried out by public officials motivated by private gain – for example: “Corruption is the abuse of power by a public official for private gain” (Nye 1967: 417). While definitions in this area inevitably are stipulative to some extent and depend on one’s purposes, there are a number of problems with this kind of definition insofar as it purports to be a general definition, serviceable in relation to corruption in all its forms and institutional settings (or at least the main ones). First, this kind of definition captures a category of actions – corruption – in part in terms of the motivation for it – private gain. This is problematic because the motives for corruption are evidently manifold. Specifically, there are a large number of corrupt actions undertaken for the public good. These are referred to in the lit- erature as acts of noble-cause corruption. Consider the police officer who fabricates evidence to secure the conviction of a known lawbreaker (see police ethics; dirty hands), or a government that terminates a criminal investigation in the national interest. The Orson Welles film Touch of Evil exemplifies the former. An instance of the latter might be the UK government’s termination of the Serious Fraud Squad’s investigation into corruption in the multibillion dollar BAE arms deal with Saudi Arabia. Evidently, preserving good relations with the Saudi government was judged to be more important to the national interest than prosecuting UK companies involved in large‐scale corruption. Nevertheless, such governmental intervention, assuming that it took place, is surely corruption: it amounts to perverting the course of justice.