What Are Nervous Systems For? Martin Fultot, P. Adrian Frazier, M. T. Turvey, and Claudia Carello Center for the Ecological Study of Perception and Action, University of Connecticut ABSTRACT An underlying bias of contemporary cognitive science is that the brain and nervous system are in the business of carrying out compu- tations and building representations. Gibson’s ecological approach, in contrast, is decidedly noncomputational and nonrepresentational. How, then, are we to construe the role of brain and nervous system? We consider this question against the backdrop of evidence for rich achievements in perception and action by agents without brains or nervous systems. If fundamental coordination of perception and action does not require a neural substrate, then what value is added in having one? And if the neural substrate is not in the representa- tional–computational business, then what business is it in? We pur- sue answers grounded in the constraints of macroscopic, multicellular life and thermodynamics. Gibson tends to leave the organism, if not empty, apparently stuffed with foam rubber (Pribram, 1982, p. 370) One dimension of notoriety for Gibson’s ecological approach is its lack of enthusiasm for explaining the achievements of perception and action by recourse to neurophysiology. The litany of disparagements that can be quoted from proponents of the ecological approach is unabashed and unambiguous. Much of what has been written takes pains to elucidate why driving an explanation of perception–action from neurophysiology is unsatisfactory. In contrast with the opening lamentation from Pribram, however, a number of those same scholars have also offered suggestions about the style of approach to understanding the role of brain and nervous system that would be more compatible with an ecological approach to perception–action. In this article, we will briefly summarize these historical tacks in order to set the stage for what we see as the requisite framework for understanding what nervous systems are for. At issue is the question: What value do they add? What do they do that has warranted reproduction or, even more fundamentally, warranted their emergence in evolution? Ecological rationales for skepticism Those in the thrall of neurophysiology look to machinery for lessons on what kinds of processes are being implemented in carrying out perception and action. Historically, the ß 2019 Taylor & Francis Group, LLC CONTACT Martin Fultot martin.flament_fultot@uconn.edu CESPA Box 1020, Department of Psychological Sciences, University of Connecticut, Storrs, CT 06269-1020. ECOLOGICAL PSYCHOLOGY 2019, VOL. 31, NO. 3, 218–234 https://doi.org/10.1080/10407413.2019.1615205 DO NOT DUPLICATE