Female Directors’ Monitoring and Major Shareholders’ Tunneling: Evidence from Chinese Stock Market Guanglei Zhou *a , Jingyue Liao a , and Xuan Pan a 1 Central University of Finance and Economics, Beijing, China Current Edition: March 1, 2019 Abstract There are few studies on whether female directors can restrain the tunneling behavior of major shareholders in Chinese stock market. Based on the analysis of the propor- tion and independence of female directors, this paper uses the fixed-effect model to analyze the impact of female directors on tunneling behavior of large shareholders in the board of directors, and further studies the difference of this impact between com- panies with different forms of ownership, and makes an empirical test with the data of A-share listed companies in China from 2008 to 2017. It is found that female directors and independent directors have an inhibitory effect on tunneling of large sharehold- ers in listed companies, and this effect is more significant in state-owned enterprises than in non-state-owned enterprises. Therefore, only by focusing on the allocation of the proportion of men and women on the board of directors, improving the incentive mechanism and employment system, and continuing to strengthen supervision, can we strengthen the interests of major shareholders, management and minority shareholders, and effectively improve corporate governance. Keywords : female shareholders; tunneling; ownership form. * Corresponding author: guangleizhou@gmail.com