Hume’s Science of Mind and Newtonianism Page 1 of 20 PRINTED FROM OXFORD HANDBOOKS ONLINE (www.oxfordhandbooks.com). © Oxford University Press, 2018. All Rights Reserved. Under the terms of the licence agreement, an individual user may print out a PDF of a single chapter of a title in Oxford Handbooks Online for personal use (for details see Privacy Policy and Legal Notice). Subscriber: Bodleian Libraries of the University of Oxford; date: 02 September 2019 Subject: Philosophy, History of Western Philosophy (Post-Classical) Online Publication Date: Aug 2019 DOI: 10.1093/oxfordhb/9780199930418.013.19 Hume’s Science of Mind and Newtonianism Tamás Demeter The Oxford Handbook of Newton Edited by Eric Schliesser and Chris Smeenk Abstract and Keywords This chapter explores the prospects and consequences of various ways to forge Newton ian connections to Hume’s philosophy. Two points of view are offered from which these connections are visible and evaluable: first, Hume’s experimental method for the studying of the mind, particularly his reliance on analysis, synthesis and successive approxima tions in relation to Newton’s method and Newton-inspired methodologies; and second, the relation of Hume’s model of the mind to Newton’s model of the natural world, particu larly the congruence of Hume’s theory of association with the chemical idea of elective affinities as opposed to gravity. In conclusion, the chapter summarizes the significance of these connections for competing interpretations of Hume’s science of the mind. Keywords: gravity, association, elective affinities, successive approximations, experimental method, analysis, syn thesis, chemistry, model of the mind Introduction There is widespread agreement among Hume scholars that Hume’s philosophy can find a meaningful place in the Newtonian tradition. 1 There are some commentators (see e.g., Barfoot 1990, Sapadin 1997) who are inclined to think that Hume’s attempt in the Trea tise of Human Nature “to introduce the experimental method of reasoning into moral sub jects,” as its subtitle announces, alludes more to Boyle than to Newton (e.g., Barfoot 1990, Schliesser 2009a), but they represent a minority view. Among those emphasizing the Newtonian connections of Hume’s philosophy, the dominant focus is on the connec tions with the Principia. By contrast, the connections with the Opticks and the research traditions it initiated are less frequently paid attention to. I find most plausible the view that Hume’s work should be placed in the context of Opticks-inspired Newtonianism. 2 I argue that for a general interpretation of the Humean theory of mind the stance a commentator takes concerning the character of Hume’s New tonianism has real significance: Principia- and Opticks-inspired stances suggest and sup port divergent lines of interpretations in Hume’s philosophy of mind and epistemology.