Forthcoming in the Journal of Philosophical Research. This is the penultimate draft. Please quote the published version. CLASSIFICATION OF DISJUNCTIVISM ABOUT THE PHENOMENOLOGY OF VISUAL EXPERIENCE Takuya Niikawa Institut Jean Nicod niitaku11@gmail.com Abstract: This paper proposes a classificatory framework for disjunctivism about the phenomenology of visual perceptual experience. Disjunctivism of this sort is typically divided into positive and negative disjunctivism. This distinction successfully reflects the disagreement amongst disjunctivists regarding the explanatory status of the introspective indiscriminability of veridical perception and hallucination. However, it is unsatisfactory in two respects. First, it cannot accommodate eliminativism about the phenomenology of hallucination. Second, the class of positive disjunctivism is too coarse-grained to provide an informative overview of the current dialectical landscape. Given this, I propose a classificatory framework which preserves the positive-negative distinction, but which also includes the distinction between eliminativism and non- eliminativism, as well as a distinction between two subclasses of positive disjunctivism. In describing each class in detail, I specify who takes up each position in the existing literature, and demonstrate that this classificatory framework can disambiguate some existing disjunctivist views. I. INTRODUCTION: NAÏVE REALISM AND DISJUNCTIVISM In recent years, there has been a renewal of interest in naïve realism with regard to visual perceptual experience. What I refer to as ‘naïve realism’ is a view about the phenomenal aspect of veridical visual perceptual experience, according to which the phenomenology of veridical visual perceptual experience is (at least partially) 1