1 Final pre-print version. Please refer to published version in Phronesis (forthcoming 2019, advance publication DOI: https://doi.org/10.1163/15685284-12341969) Is Plato an Innatist in the Meno? David Bronstein Department of Philosophy, Georgetown University, 215 New North Hall, 37th and O Streets, N.W., Washington D.C. 20057. USA db1096@georgetown.edu Whitney Schwab University of Maryland, Baltimore County, 463 Performing Arts and Humanities Building, 1000 Hilltop Circle, Baltimore, MD 21250. USA wschwab@umbc.edu Abstract Plato in the Meno is standardly interpreted as committed to condition innatism: human beings are born with latent innate states of knowledge. Against this view, Gail Fine has argued for prenatalism: human souls possess knowledge in a disembodied state but lose it upon being embodied. We argue against both views and in favor of content innatism: human beings are born with innate cognitive contents that can be, but do not exist innately in the soul as, the contents of states of knowledge. Content innatism has strong textual support and constitutes a philosophically interesting theory. Keywords Plato; Meno; innatism; epistēmē; doxa 1. Introduction The question that serves as the title of this paper might seem like one not worth asking. Not because it is uninteresting or philosophically unimportant, but because the answer to it is largely taken to be settled: yes, in the Meno Plato maintains that human beings are innately endowed with knowledge (epistēmē), and what we call ‘learning’ consists in recollecting it.