Indian Journal of Economics and Development, Vol 5 (11), November 2017 ISSN(online):2320-9836 ISSN (Print):2320-9828 Game theory and its application on vote trading in the United States of America Mihir Parekh Department of International Studies and History, Christ University, Bangalore- 5600029, India mvparkh@gmail.com Abstract Objective: To showcase that vote trading for both dominant party voters such as the republicans and individual candidate voters is a tool that can alter the outcomes of the presidential elections in the USA. Methods: The concept of game theory has been implemented to show voter behaviour between dominant party voters and individual candidate voters. Game theory in this case outlines the various combinations of actions and outcomes that will take place on election day between these two sets of voters and eliminates the unfavourable combinations and brings out the most viable and lucrative option for both groups of voters. Findings: This paper successfully concludes that vote trading is an essential tool and process that will aid in the winning of Presidential elections for the dominant political parties such as the republicans or the democrats. More exclusively, the paper finds that vote trading is also one of the finer methods for political parties to capture swing states on Election Day, allowing them a better chance - according to statistical analysis of US presidential election winners - to win the entirety of the election. The conclusiveness of this finding via elimination of alternative actions further strengthens the need to bring vote trading as a practice behind which strong legislation should be put forth to facilitate the flowing of votes in the interests of supply and demand. Applications: The findings of this paper can be applied in furthering the need of making vote trading a legally recognized political process. Keywords: Game theory; presidential election; vote trading. 1. Introduction At the outset, one must first understand the very concepts that go behind the election process of the United States as well as the nature of the system at large. In the United States, states are divided into three types every four years as a new presidential election is about to begin. The first of the three are regular states (RS), the second are swing states (SS), and the third are dominant states (DS). To simplify the understanding of the three types we can say: 1. Regular states (RS): These are states where no party or candidate that is running in the presidential election has a clear majority of votes in the said state. 2. Swing states (SS): These are states where the entirety of the state is divided between two majority parties (for example: the Republicans and the Democrats) and the state’s voters could ‘Swing’ between voting for either party. Swing states are considered prime in winning the elections and statistical trends over the years have shown that parties and candidates that win swing states are more likely to win the entire election. 3. Dominant states (DS): These are states where one party has a clear majority and is bound to win the state’s votes irrespective of any change in the political climate. Either the Democrats or the Republicans are expected to win the state in terms of votes - even if they had their hands ‘Tied behind their backs’ so to speak. 4. Individual candidate (IC). This candidate runs for the elections alongside the two dominant parties - the Republicans and Democrats and contests in the Electoral College the same way the other candidates do. For the purpose of this paper, I will be excluding the participation of voters in regular states and will be solely looking at how voters of dominant parties in dominant states and voters of individual candidates in swing states behave with each other when the time of voting arises. Moreover, this paper will be looking in to how the tool of vote trading can prove to be essential for any dominant state party to win the entirety of the election via the concept of game theory. 1 www.iseeadyar.org