271 “Despite all of its symbolic continuity, Kazakhstan is a society in transition.” Social Change Unsettles Kazakhstan ALIMA BISSENOVA I t is often noted that Kazakhstan was the last Soviet republic to declare its independence. Twenty-eight years later, it has become a very different society. To some extent, this has been missed by Western experts and media outlets, mainly because of their focus on the longevity of former President Nursultan Nazarbayev’s rule. This preoccupation with the workings of the re- gime has produced a kind of a freeze-frame image of Kazakhstan under unchanging and supposedly omnipotent leadership. Beneath this seemingly still surface, tremen- dous changes have taken place, some of them brought about by the developmentalist policies of the state and others introduced by forces outside the regime’s control. Most of these shifts can be grouped under four rubrics: migration, urbaniza- tion, Islamization, and globalization. Even after his unexpected March 2019 an- nouncement that he was resigning as president, Nazarbayev is still the elephant in the room, fram- ing and influencing the country’s path. He retains important positions as chair of the National Se- curity Council and head of the ruling party Nur Otan; his status as “Leader of the Nation” is pro- tected by legislation that gives him immunity from prosecution for life. Nazarbayev’s presence is also felt symbolically through the renaming of the capital, Astana, as Nur-Sultan, which was proclaimed soon after his resignation to honor one of the main achieve- ments of his rule—building a new capital city to represent a new wave of Kazakh modernization. Prominent streets and sites, including the univer- sity where I work, are named in his honor as well. Despite all of its symbolic continuity, Kazakh- stan is a society in transition. First and foremost, it has changed demographically. Ethnic Kazakhs, once a minority, now form an increasing majority of the growing population of 18.5 million. Twenty- one percent of the population comprises young people from the ages of 14 to 29. Most of them live in the cities and aspire to lead “modern” lives— with a good education, job, and housing—even if they embrace various and sometimes conflicting values and orientations. STEPPE IN MOTION Since the fall of the Soviet Union, Kazakhstan has experienced huge population movements. Al- though not directly comparable, these should be viewed against the backdrop of the catastrophes and population transfers that occurred in the same territory in the twentieth century. The disastrous impacts of collectivization and forced sedentariza- tion—when the Soviets stopped people from prac- ticing centuries-old forms of nomadic pastoralism and confiscated their livestock—led to a 1929–32 famine and the outmigration of Kazakhs to China, Mongolia, and neighboring Soviet republics. It was the greatest loss of life and culture in Kazakh memory. In the post–World War II period, Kazakhstan was the only Soviet republic in which the “titular” ethnic group did not comprise a majority of the population. The demographic shift—the increase in ethnic Kazakhs and the parallel decrease in the European and Slavic populations—began in the late Soviet era, driven by a higher birth rate among Kazakhs and the Slavic people’s greater disposition to migrate to other parts of the Soviet Union. The collapse of the USSR dramatically accelerated the process. Some 3.4 million people, mainly of European and Slavic descent, have left Kazakhstan since the Soviet disintegration in 1991. Outmigration peaked in 1994, when nearly half a million people emigrat- ed. The exodus continued until the middle of the 2000s, when more people were entering the coun- ALIMA BISSENOVA is an associate professor of anthropology at Nazarbayev University.