NATURE HUMAN BEHAVIOUR 1, 0118 (2017) | DOI: 10.1038/s41562-017-0095 | www.nature.com/nathumbehav 1 comment PUBLISHED: 26 MAY 2017 | VOLUME: 1 | ARTICLE NUMBER: 0095 How and why we should take deradicalization seriously Daniel Koehler Deradicalization programmes are the cornerstone of counter-terrorism strategies in many countries, yet few have been evaluated for their efectiveness. Stakeholders must introduce standards to ensure basic elements are in place, such as programme development, staf training, advisory services, and transparency. W hen, in 2008, TIME magazine chose reversing radicalism as one of its ten ideas for changing the world 1 , deradicalization programmes had only recently started to gain interest from international researchers and policymakers. Following the frst prison- based programmes designed to challenge the theological convictions of incarcerated jihadists, which came into existence in the Middle East afer the 9/11 attacks, a global search for new and alternative counter-terrorism methods beyond the classic ‘kinetic’ approach — the targeted killing and arresting of radicals, violent extremists and terrorists — began. Quickly, this new approach — deradicalization — became a promising route to challenge and break the psychological or ideological commitment of members of terrorist and violent extremist organizations. Although these groups can be physically defeated or forced into the defensive, arresting and killing are not efective methods to defeat the psychological attraction of extremist groups and their ideology, nor to efectively counter violent radicalization processes leading to new generations of committed extremists and terrorists. It seemed that deradicalization programmes (which were later termed countering violent extremism (CVE) programmes) were especially suitable for that difcult task. Indeed, between 40 and 50 high-profle CVE programmes currently exist around the world, all with the goal to intervene and dismantle a person’s physical and psychological bond to terrorist and violent extremist groups. The Gordian knot of deradicalization Despite the striking “lack of conceptual clarity in the emerging discourse on deradicalization” 2 and the substantial problems with assessing the success of these programmes due to, among other issues, the lack of information about their day-to-day operations and because external researchers are usually not granted access 3 , no substantial improvement has been made. Even though an increasing number of academic articles and books have focused on the topic of deradicalization processes and programmes in recent years 4 , the spread of practical initiatives has outpaced their theoretical and methodological development. In a seriously under- researched feld such as deradicalization, it is worrying that most Western countries — as well as numerous Middle Eastern and Southeast Asian countries — see CVE and deradicalization programmes as strategic cornerstones in their counter- terrorism policies, despite the fact that the handful of academic experts and experienced practitioners in the feld are still engaged in fundamental debates about terminology, scope of programmes and efect measurement. So far, the expert community in the slowly emerging feld of deradicalization research is continually pointing out that almost no deradicalization or CVE programme has undergone a signifcant evaluation upholding the minimum standards of academic integrity; that even the question of which metrics can be measured to indicate success is highly problematic; and that the variety of approaches and methods that come under the CVE label is largely applied without any coherent theory of efect or assumed mechanism of action. Even if these questions seem banal, they are essential to the wider counter-terrorism feld because ill-designed and inefective deradicalization programmes (however ‘efective’ is framed and measured) are not only a waste of important resources, but also, more importantly, increase the threat and risk of terrorism and violent extremism by applying incorrect methods based on inadequate needs assessments, failing to detect high-risk cases, giving away critical counter-argumentation techniques, or helping committed extremists and terrorists to re-enter a society without raising the authorities’ suspicion. Deradicalization is a complex and delicate type of counter-terrorism operation that requires high operational standards and procedures, expert training, typological adaptation (that is, to identify and apply the appropriate type of deradicalization programme for the chosen goals and target groups) and detailed programme design according to the specifc context and goals. Currently, the prevailing opinion among practitioners and policymakers is that either religious authorities should be tasked with debating extremists into submission using theological arguments, or psychologists should determine and treat the underlying mental health issues of the radicalization process to extinguish the bond between the individual programme participant and the extremist ideology or group. Both approaches seem to be ill-advised and inefective for tackling a psychological process (radicalization) in which “global, sociological and political drivers matter as much as ideological and psychological ones” 5 . How to untie the knot A coherent theory of (de)radicalization and evidence-based good-practice standards The spread of practical initiatives has outpaced their theoretical and methodological development. ©2017MacmillanPublishersLimited,partofSpringerNature.Allrightsreserved.