How do Sages Differ from the Rest of Us? The Views of Zhu Xi and Jeong Yagyong Youngsun Back In Traditional Korean Philosophy: Problems and Debates, edited by Youngsun Back and Philip J. Ivanhoe (Rowman & Littlefield International, 2016), 147-176. Abstract This paper examines the conceptions of the sage in the thought of Zhu Xi 朱熹 (1130-1200) of Song China and Jeong Yagyong 丁若鏞 (1762-1836) of Joseon Korea. I argue that they held completely contrasting views of the sage: for Zhu Xi, sages are set apart from ordinary human beings, whereas for Jeong, sages are one of us; for Zhu Xi, sages appear and function in the world in the manner of “non-intentional action” (無為 wuwei), whereas for Jeong in the manner of “intentional action” (作為 zuowei). I further argue that from this analysis and comparison of their differing views of the sage, we can discern two distinct versions of moral equality: for Jeong, at least in the moral realm, human beings are equal in potentiality as well as in capacity to become a sage, whereas for Zhu Xi, human beings are equal in a negative sense that we may not all be capable of becoming a sage. These different conceptualizations of moral equality led them to devise their self-cultivation programs in different directions: the individual project of me becoming a sage vs. the joint project of us producing a sage. Keywords Sage, Human Nature, Contingency, Moral Equality, Zhu Xi, Jeong Yagyong, Dasan