MENU MENU Algeria’s Hirak movement is rejecting the continuation of old ways in new forms. How will the army respond? The Algerian army has a problem. The country’s octogenarian president, Abdelaziz Bouteflika, fell from power in April under the pressure of the Hirak, an autonomous protest movement that emerged in February 2019, gathering millions of people in twice-weekly marches. But this left a power void that no existing elites were able to fill: none enjoyed sufficient legitimacy in the eyes of the public. Since then, the army has found itself obliged to openly assume the role of the country’s decision-maker. Algerians have long been aware of the military leadership’s omnipotence in the country, but the façade of a civilian president had helped it avoid direct answerability for its actions. Since the president’s ousting, the army’s only solution for avoiding conflict with the huge popular protest movement – which is now asking for a transfer of military power to civilians and the establishment of the rule of law – has been to push for the appointment of a new head of state – anyone – and quickly. In September army chief Ahmed Gaid Salah announced the presidential election would take place on 12 December – the poll had already been cancelled twice under pressure from the street, and does not appear to be enough to quell the crisis. The general has failed to devise a political architecture that legitimises the vote process, and the maintaining of a non-elected interim government beyond its constitutional term, have together created an ideological vacuum that every week is filled with the slogans of millions of demonstrators all over the country. By becoming, de facto, the only possible forum for any negotiations on a new pact between the government and the people, the Hirak has profoundly shaken up the balance of power in the Algerian political system. So, beyond the stalemate of aborted elections dictated from above, the challenge that the Algerian army faces will be to find a way to accommodate the new decision-making power requested by the Algerian people, while redefining an institutional framework that ensures its own legitimacy. AN ARMY WITHOUT A PLAN A close ally of Bouteflika, Gaid Salah adapted quickly to the upheaval of the political landscape after the eruption of the Hirak protests. He positioned the army as the only institution capable of “saving the country”. The “split” from the “mafia“ of the former regime had to be made concrete by new elections, which he attempted to give credibility by throwing in prison oligarchs and patrons of the former president on corruption grounds. Gaid Salah also deliberately excluded from the transition narrative structural elements of the old regime, such as: the National Liberation Front, formerly the country’s only party; the intelligence and security services; and the UGTA, the only central union recognised by the authorities. He gave incessant speeches about the necessity of elections, drowning out the interim president and head of government Abdelkader Bensalah and Noureddine Bedoui, in the process. Gaid Salah also dismissed the “mediation and dialogue committee”. This was a body of self-proclaimed civil society activists, sponsored by the regime to compensate its lack of dialogue with the street. He did so after its members recommended the resignation of the interim government as a first step to dissipating the post-Bouteflika crisis of representation denounced by the Hirak. Gaid Salah’s central role enabled the army to take total control of the country’s resources, which over the last      Listen to the street: The new Algerian transition Amel Boubekeur  1st November, 2019 ECFR uses cookies to gather analytics and give you and others the best possible experience on our site. Find out more Accept Decline