1 Cognitive confinement: theoretical considerations on the construction of a cognitive niche, and on how it can go wrong 1 . Konrad Werner, University of Warsaw This paper appeared in Synthese You can download it from https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s11229-019-02464-7 ABSTRACT This paper aims to elucidate a kind of ignorance that is more fundamental than a momentary lack of information, but also not a kind of ignorance that is built into the subject’s cognitive apparatus such that the subject can’t do anything about it (e.g. col or blindness). The paper sets forth the notion of cognitive confinement, which is a contingent, yet relatively stable state of being structurally or systematically unable to gain information from an environment, determined by patterns of interaction between the subject and the world. In order to unpack the idea of cognitive confinement the paper discusses niche construction theory, and then, in greater detail, the notion of cognitive niche once proposed by John Tooby and Irven DeVore. Cognitive confinement is here imagined as a pathologized form of cognitive niche. This posit is substantiated by referring to a case that has come to the fore in recent years and raised debate around the world: the rise of so-called filter bubbles. They turn out to be instantiations of a more general phenomenon of cognitive confinement. 1. Introduction: embodied ignorance If I don't know what the capital of Australia is, I am the only one who can be blamed for my ignorance, since there is no systemic reason, no obstacles built into my cognitive apparatus, my environment or my socio-economic situation that would prevent me from knowing it. On the other hand, if I can't tell which one of bananas lying in front of me is green and which is yellow, I cannot be blamed since this color ignorance results from a certain disability of my cognitive apparatus. This paper aims to elucidate a different kind of ignorance: more fundamental than a momentary lack of information, but also not a kind of ignorance that is built into the subject's cognitive apparatus or her surroundings, such that the subject can't do anything about it. The paper sets forth the notion of cognitive confinement, which is a state of being structurally or systematically unable to gain information from an environment, determined by patterns of interaction between the subject and the world. One might also describe it as an embodied ignorance that emerges when the said interactions go wrong. The term "embodied" is supposed to reflect the fact that the ignorance in question comes about not at the level of the 1 This work was supported by the grant 2016/20/S/HS1/00046 provided by the National Science Centre, Poland. In the first place I would like to thank Krystian Wiciarz for his insightful comments on an early stage of this project. Parts of this paper were presented publicly at the Social Ontology conference in Boston at Tufts University, 2018. I would like to thank for the feedback I got there. Last but not least, many thanks to the anonymous reviewers for their valuable remarks.