Epistemic Emotions and the Value of Truth Laura Candiotto, Free University of Berlin laura.candiotto@fu-berlin.de This is a pre-print of an article published in Acta Analytica, 2019. The final authenticated version is available online at: https://doi.org/10.1007/s12136-019-00416-x Introduction In the last decades, there has been an upsurge interest in the function played by emotions in the cognitive processes. Inspired by the evidence provided by cognitive science, philosophers of mind have started to integrate emotions in their theories of mind and employ the concept of "cognitive emotions", "intellectual emotions", or "epistemic emotions" for depicting their positive role in the cognitive enterprise (Scheffler 1991; Stoker 2004; Morton 2010). 1 Epistemologists have remained more sceptical about the possible positive role of emotions in knowledge acquisition, and the majority of studies have been dedicated to their detrimental function instead. 2 An exception can be found in the research programs of some proponents of 1 A significant shift in cognitive science from the interactionist models of the late Nineties to the more recent integrationist models for which emotion and cognition are deeply entangled in our mental life is recognisable in the literature. However, this does not mean that there is a consensus about what our best science says regarding the emotions, and this is also reflected in the different philosophical conceptualisations about them. Some good exemplars are de Sousa 1987 on the two systems theory (also called "Two-Track Mind"), Griffiths 1997 and DeLancey 2001 on the evolutionary approach and Ekman's basic emotions, Prinz 2004 in relation to Damasio's somatic marker hypothesis, Thagard 2008 on the interactionist model, and Wilkinson et. al 2019 on predictive processing. 2 The conceptualisation of emotions as misguided judgements, confused perceptions, or irrational states has a long tradition. For an overview, see Solomon 1998 and Sorabji 2000. But it can also be found in the contemporary discussion in epistemology, especially regarding specific epistemic practices. See, for example, Mele 2000 about the role of emotions in self-deception, and Elster 2010 in counter wishful thinking.