The Journal of Private Enterprise 34(4), 2019, 75–97 Export Jobs, Special Interest Groups, and the US Presidential Election of 2016: The Case of West Virginia Tomi Ovaska Youngstown State University Ryo Takashima Sophia University __________________________________________________________ Abstract In this West Virginia case study, we highlight the success of traditional, small special interest groups in the 2016 US presidential election and demonstrate through county-level export-data regression analysis how the grip of small import-competing groups in West Virginia is loosening in a globalizing world. We show how the previously successful anti-import groups now face new small producer and consumer groups that are also well organized and whose income depends on open trade. Using graphical analysis, we also show that when the anti-import groups lose relative standing, society’s deadweight loss caused by trade restraints gets increasingly smaller. __________________________________________________________ JEL Codes: D72, F10, F69, H25 Keywords: China tariffs, export-supported jobs, international trade, Mancur Olson, political economy, presidential election, rent seeking, special interest groups, tariffs, the logic of collective action, Donald Trump, welfare analysis, West Virginia I. Introduction During the 2016 presidential election, two camps of small special interest groups in West Virginia had opposing views on the benefits of international trade. Following the previous works by Olson (1965), Stigler (1971), Peltzman (1976), and Becker (1983), we establish an empirical connection between the winning candidate’s trade orientation and his vote share. Our study also provides evidence on how an antitrade stance in elections is coming under increasing pressure with advancing globalization and the consequent strengthening of new, small, concentrated protrade special interest