Fitness industry self-regulation: institutional or by choice? John Douglas MacFarlane Unitec Institute of Technology, Auckland, New Zealand Sean Phelps Colorado Mesa University, Grand Junction, Colorado, USA, and Nico Schulenkorf University of Technology Sydney, Sport Management, Sydney, Australia Abstract Purpose – The purpose of this paper is to document and explore the perceptual motivations for voluntary and continued affiliation with a fitness industry register by its affiliates (“members”) and non-affiliates ( “non-members”). The formation of fitness industry registers to impart self-regulation is a common global occurrence. Their sustainment, however, is reliant on the motivations and voluntary support of industry members. Limited work has been done in this area. Design/methodology/approach – This qualitative study uses the interpretive research paradigm, involving semi-structured interviews with 12 Auckland, New Zealand, fitness centre managers, industry associations, New Zealand Register of Exercise Professionals (Reps NZ) and Fitness New Zealand. Lenox’s (2006) participation-contingent benefits framework provides the necessary lens to explore the perceptual motivations behind participation/non-participation by fitness centres with an industry self-regulatory system (i.e. Reps NZ). Findings – Whereas participation-contingent benefits are perceived minimal, and exceeded by affiliation limitations, there is institutional congruence for industry regulation to exist, thus creating institutional pressures that encourage affiliation and retention. Whereas affiliates choose to absorb the associated inconveniences of affiliation to “support” Reps NZ, non-affiliates question the register’s regulatory form, choosing to avoid the affiliation costs and limitations. Originality/value – This study lends further support that institutional development is crucial for inclusive, substantive and sustainable self-regulatory systems. Regardless of the perceived low return on participation- contingent benefits, industry self-regulation can be sustained if there is a desire by industry members to maintain the institutional notion that the regulation needs to exist. Keywords Institutions, Fitness industry registers, Industry self-regulation, Participation-contingent benefits Paper type Research paper Introduction Increased public scrutiny, social expectation and political pressure have imposed marketplace environments that are rife with operational unpredictability (Gunningham and Rees, 1997; Ashby et al., 2004; Porter and Ronit, 2006). Subsequently, organisations are subjected to environmental pressures from their constituents to behave socially responsible (Campbell, 2006; Lynch-Wood et al., 2009; Bowen, 2019). One industry strategy to negate constituent pressure has been the development of industry-funded regulatory systems (Lenox, 2006; Long and Driscoll, 2008). Identified as industry self-regulation, these organisational structures represent the voluntary actions by an industry to regulate itself, devoid of any governmental involvement (Gunningham and Rees, 1997; Christmann and Taylor, 2006). Subsequently a form of self-imposed compliance is imparted. Around the world, self-regulation of the fitness industry through the formation of industry registers has been commonplace (Thompson, 2014). Traditionally observed as “[…]largely unregulated and lack[ing] a unified governing body” (Melton et al., 2008, p. 883), the fitness industry has strategically formed registers to infer industry certification and legitimise those who service the field (i.e. fitness centres, exercise professionals and educational providers). Sport, Business and Management: An International Journal © Emerald Publishing Limited 2042-678X DOI 10.1108/SBM-11-2018-0098 Received 8 November 2018 Accepted 6 August 2019 The current issue and full text archive of this journal is available on Emerald Insight at: www.emeraldinsight.com/2042-678X.htm Fitness industry self-regulation