Non-traditional security cooperation between China and south-east Asia: implications for Indo-Pacifc geopolitics XUE GONG * International Afairs 96: 1 (2020) 29–48; doi: 10.1093/ia/iiz225 © The Author(s) 2020. Published by Oxford University Press on behalf of The Royal Institute of International Afairs. All rights reserved. For permissions, please e-mail: journals.permissions@oup.com The growth of China’s power and infuence, as well as its assertive security activities in the past decade, have generated tremendous geopolitical repercus- sions in Asia and beyond. Regional states, especially the major players, have been contemplating new strategies and policies in reaction to Beijing’s growing weight. The ‘free and open Indo-Pacifc’ (FOIP) strategy, actively promoted by the United States with support from its allies and partners, is perhaps the most signifcant geopolitical response formulated by major powers in the region with the aim of infuencing Chinese behaviour and constraining China’s expanding ambitions. Foreseeing the negative impact of this US-led Indo-Pacifc strategy on its national interests in Asia and the Indian Ocean region, 1 China has adopted various new strategies to cope with the challenges presented by the FOIP. Its major strategic moves include improvement of relations with Japan, 2 strategic detente with India, 3 and acceleration of regional economic integration schemes such as the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP). 4 China regards its economic prowess as an important item in its policy toolkit. Some Chinese policy analysts even advocate China’s membership in the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacifc Partnership (CPTPP) to better position the country in the region’s evolving strategic environment. 5 The Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), * This article is part of the January 2020 special issue of International Afairs on ‘Unpacking the strategic dynamics of the Indo-Pacifc’, guest-edited by Kai He and Mingjiang Li. 1 Rosemary Foot, ‘Remembering the past to secure the present: Versailles legacies in a resurgent China’, Inter- national Afairs 95: 1, Jan. 2019, pp. 143–60; Wu Xinbo, ‘China in search of a liberal partnership international order’, International Afairs 94: 5, Sept. 2018, pp. 995–1018. 2 Li Keqiang, ‘Rang zhongri heping youhao shiye zai qihang, zai riben zhaorixinwen fabiao shuming wenzhang’ [Let the Sino-Japanese peace and friendship cause sail again], Asahi Shimbun, 8 May 2018, http://www.gov.cn/ gongbao/content/2018/content_5301805.htm; Shogo Suzuki and Corey Wallace, ‘Explaining Japan’s response to geopolitical vulnerability’, International Afairs 94: 4, July 2018, pp. 711–34. (Unless otherwise noted at point of citation, all URLs cited in this article were accessible on 4 Oct. 2019.) 3 Kiran Sharma, ‘Detente in the borderlands for India and China’, Nikkei Asian Review, 31 Aug. 2017, https:// asia.nikkei.com/Spotlight/China-India-Tensions/India-China-agree-to-resolve-border-standof4. 4 Shang Kaiyuan, ‘China to accelerate negotiations on regional trade pact: ofcial’, People’s Daily, 12 March 2019, http://en.people.cn/n3/2019/0312/c90000-9555276.html. 5 Wang Huiyao, ‘Zhudong jiaru CPTPP, yi jiaqun lai wei zhongmei maoyi zhengduan “jianzhen”’ [Take the initiative to join CPTPP to reduce the tensions from Sino-American trade war], Financial Times (Chinese), 8 Jan. 2019, http://www.ftchinese.com/story/001080979?full=y&archive.