Daniel D. De Haan & Brandon Dahm, “Thomas Aquinas on Separated Souls as Incomplete Human Persons” The Thomist (Forthcoming) 1 There is a substantive disagreement among readers of Thomas Aquinas over the status of the human soul after death: is it a human person? Aquinas unequivocally holds that the separated soul is not a [complete] person. 1 This essay argues that Aquinas’s metaphysics of the human person is committed in principle to the doctrine that the separated rational soul of the human person after death is an incomplete person, because he holds that the separated rational soul is an incomplete hoc aliquid that performs rational operations. Survivalism Human Person survives death with the separated rational soul because the separated rational soul is a person Corruptionism Human Person corrupts at death; the separated rational soul survives death but it is not a person Incomplete persons Human Person corrupts at death; the separated rational soul survives death as an incomplete person Three Criteria for Persons simpliciter Subsistence: If a being is a person, then it is per se subsistent individual. Rationality of the Supposit If a being is a person, then it is a supposit that performs rational operations in virtue of the rationality of its nature. Completeness: If a being is a person, then it is complete or a whole. Thesis: The anima separata is not a complete person, but it is an incomplete person, because it satisfies the subsistence and rationality of the supposit criteria, and incompletely satisfies four of the five modes of completeness of the completeness criterion. 1) Subsistence Criterion • Person individual substance or hoc aliquid of a rational nature • Metaphysics of the person presupposes and tracks the metaphysics of the hoc aliquid • QDdA 1. Two senses of a hoc aliquid: • A human is a complete hoc aliquid b/c per se subsistent and complete in species • The rational soul is an incomplete hoc aliquid b/c per se subsistent but incomplete in species • Anima separata is a rational incomplete hoc aliquid, i.e., it is an incomplete person 2) Rationality of the Supposit Criterion • Obj: Why not two persons in statu viae? • actiones sunt suppositorium (not of the subject, i.e., qua form-matter or rational soul) o Anima separata : composite of esse, rational soul, possible & agent intellect, will, & habitus o Esse inclusive sense of supposit • Before death, the human is the supposit, but the rational soul is not a supposit b/c it does not perform any operations • After the death of the human the anima separata is a supposit b/c it performs rational operations 3) Completeness Criterion 1) anima separata has operational completeness 2) anima separata has subsisting or existential completeness 3) anima separata has formal completeness 4) anima separata has the completeness of a supposit 5) anima separata lacks specific or essential completeness 1 Cf. In Sent. III.5.3.2ad1: “Ad primum ergo dicendum, quod anima separata, proprie loquendo, non est substantia alicujus naturae, sed est pars naturae.” In Sent. III.5.3.2ad3: “quod anima rationalis dicitur hoc aliquid per modum quo esse subsistens est hoc aliquid, etiam si habeat naturam partis; sed ad rationem personae exigitur ulterius quod sit totum et completum.” See In Sent. III.6.1.1.1 ad s.c.; SCG II.55; De Pot. 9.3ad13; ST III.16.12ad2.