Preprint / Final version published in: Topoi 2016 (online first article, to be assigned to the forthcoming speical issue “Negative judgement: ancient, medieval and modern perspectives”, ed. by Mika Perälä & Sonja Schierbaum) 1 Judgement in Leibniz’s Conception of the Mind: Predication, Affirmation, and Denial Christian Barth (HU Berlin) Abstract The aim of the paper is to illuminate some core aspects of Leibniz’s conception of judgement and its place in his conception of the mind. In particular, the paper argues for three claims: First, the act of judgement is at the centre of Leibniz’s conception of the mind in that minds strive at actualising innate knowledge concerning derivative truths, where the actualising involves an act of judgement. Second, Leibniz does not hold a judgement account of predication, but a two-component account that distinguishes between predication and alethic evaluation. Third, Leibniz understands the act of affirmative judgement in terms of establishing active dispositions, i.e. strivings, to make reasons available for future reasoning that aims at answering whether-questions (whether a proposition p is true or not). Correspondingly, he understands the act of negative judgement in terms of establishing dispositions to ban propositions from future reasoning that aims at answering whether- questions. In the final analysis, the acts of affirmative as well as of negative judgement turn out to be acts of changing memory dispositions. Keywords: Leibniz; Mind; Judgement; Predication; Innatism Judgement is a neglected topic in the Leibniz scholarship. At least, this is true with respect to the metaphysics and epistemology of judgement. 1 The monographs on Leibniz’s conception of the mind and his general epistemology touch the topic only peripherally. 2 Scholars working on Leibniz’s logic are mostly interested in his conceptions of predication and of proposition, but not in his metaphysics and epistemology of judgements. 3 The concept of judgement is also central to Leibniz’s legal writings. But scholars investigating Leibniz’s legal works focus on his application of logic to law and his conception of natural law, but not on Leibniz’s general conception of judgement. 4 The aim of the paper is to illuminate some core aspects of Leibniz’s conception of judgement and its place in his conception of the mind. In particular, I will argue for three claims: 1 An exception is Losonsky 2001, ch. 7. 2 See Kulstad 1991 and McRae 1976. 3 See Burkhardt 1980, Couturat 1901, Kauppi 1960, Lenzen 1990 and 2004, and Parkinson 1965, esp. ch. 1. 4 See Armgardt 2001 and Berkowitz 2005.