ARTICLE Method in Kant and Hegel Alfredo Ferrarin Dipartimento di Civilta e Forme del Sapere, University of Pisa, Pisa, Italy ABSTRACT For Kant as for Hegel method is not a structure or procedure imported into philosophy from without, as, e.g. a mathematical demonstration in modern physics or in the proof-structure of philosophies such as Spinoza’s or Wolff’s. For both Hegel and Kant method is the arrangement that reason gives its contents and cognitions; for both, that is, method and object do not fall asunder, unlike in all disciplines other than philosophy. For Kant method is the design and plan of the whole, the scientific form that guides the organization of cognitions (KrV A 707/B 736, Ak 24, 780). Likewise, Hegel writes that method is the consciousness of the form of its inner movement (WL 1, 49, SL 53, W 3 47, PhS 28). Unfortunately, Hegel never considers Kant an example or a precursor or a positive role model. It is important to ask why Hegel never takes seriously Kant’s Doctrine of Method. Why, if he shares so many central points with the Architectonic of the first Critique, does he never acknowledge Kant as a possible ally? Why does he misunderstand Kant on analysis and synthesis as he does? These are some of the questions I plan to discuss in this paper. ARTICLE HISTORY Received 13 November 2017; Revised 6 April and 15 June 2018; Accepted 26 July 2018 KEYWORDS Method; Kant; Hegel; architectonic; dialectic Quand on n’a pas de caractère, il faut bien se donner une méthode. (Albert Camus, La chute) For Kant as for Hegel method is not a structure or procedure that is ready- made and imported into philosophy from without, as, e.g. a mathematical demonstration in modern physical science or in the very proof-structure of philosophies such as Spinoza’s or Wolff’s. For both Hegel and Kant method is the way reason, as the source of a system of sciences, organizes itself in the interrelation of its moments. Far from being simply an order of exposition, method is for both the arrangement and structure that reason gives its con- tents and cognitions; for both, that is, method and object do not fall asunder, unlike in all disciplines other than philosophy. Both Kant and Hegel identify one fundamental sense of scientific method for reason (respectively, the © 2018 BSHP CONTACT Alfredo Ferrarin ferrarin@fls.unipi.it Dipartimento di Civilta e Forme del Sapere, Universita degli Studi di Pisa, Pisa 56127, Italy BRITISH JOURNAL FOR THE HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY 2019, VOL. 27, NO. 2, 255–270 https://doi.org/10.1080/09608788.2018.1506314