Theoria, Issue 162, Vol. 67, No. 1 (March 2020): 28-44 © Berghahn Books doi:10.3167/th.2020.6716202฀•฀ISSN฀0040-5817฀(Print)฀•฀ISSN฀1558-5816฀(Online) A Critique of Thaddeus Metz’s Modal Relational Account of Moral Status Olusegun Steven Samuel and Ademola Kazeem Fayemi Abstract: This article is a critique of Thaddeus Metz’s modal relational approach to moral status in African ethics (AE). According to moral relationalism (MR), a being has moral status if it exhibits the capacity for communal relationship as either a subject or an object. While Metz defends a prima facie plausibility of MR as an African account of moral status, this article provides a fresh perspective to the debate on moral status in environmental and ethical discourse. It raises two objections against MR: (1) the capability criterion inherent in MR is not only exog- enous to African thought but also undermines the viability of MR; and (2) MR cannot account for the standing of species populations. Both objections have severe implications for biodiversity conservation efforts in Africa and beyond. Keywords: Africa, capability, environmental ethics, modal relational- ism, moral status, species populations, Thaddeus Metz This article is a critical inquiry into Thaddeus Metz’s African ethical theory of modal relationalism (MR). Central to the theory of MR is the claim that something (X) has moral status by virtue of its capac- ity for communal relationship, where X could either be a subject or an object of communion. Metz considers MR as a plausible theory of moral status and morally right action from sub-Saharan Africa that deserves serious consideration just as prominent moral theories