The Somali jihadi insurgent group al-Shabaab retains both significant armed capacity and well-honed and sophisticat- ed media operations warfare capabilities. A key aspect of al-Shabaab’s media insurgency is its PSYOPS (psycholog- ical operations) messaging, targeting both rank-and-file enemy soldiers as well as the domestic electorates in ene- my countries, including the United States, Kenya, Uganda, and Burundi. In its PSYOPS and other propaganda mes- saging, al-Shabaab takes advantage of the lack of trans- parency in certain instances from its opponents, including some governments, and the demand by the international news media for details from on the ground, with the group framing itself as a reliable source of on-the-ground infor- mation. The militant group actively seeks to extend the penetration of its media messaging by attracting attention from international news media, though this practice has proved to be of mixed value. A l-Shabaab, despite being forced to withdraw from most of Somalia’s major urban centers between 2011 and 2014, has proven to be markedly resilient in the face of numerically, economically, and tech- nologically superior enemies, including the Somali Federal Government (SFG) and its main international supporters, the United Nations, United States, European Union, and African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) forces. 1 It continues to re- tain signifcant, deadly military capabilities as well as the ability to plan and successfully execute mass-casualty attacks in the heart of Somali cities, including the federal capital, Mogadishu, and on gov- ernment military bases. 2 The Somali militant group, which engages regularly in anti-civilian violence both in its terrorist attacks and as a tool of the proto-state governance of areas under its control, also continues to run a highly capable media operations apparatus that produces glossy propaganda material aimed, often in the same media product, at domestic Somali, regional East African, and in- ternational audiences. 3 Al-Shabaab’s media apparatus is particularly adept at PSYOPS (psychological operations), a targeting both the rank-and-fle sol- diers in the forces of its enemies—for example, AMISOM—as well as the voting publics in enemy countries, including the United States, United Kingdom, Kenya, Uganda, and Burundi. b PSYOPS are part of the group’s broader information operations and warfare campaign. c In its PSYOPS messaging, the Somali militant group seeks to infuence domestic politics in these countries, d particularly a The RAND Corporation’s defnition of “psychological warfare” is a type of warfare that “involves the planned use of propaganda and other psychological operations to infuence the opinions, emotions, attitudes, and behavior of opposition groups.” See “Psychological Warfare,” RAND Corporation. PSYOPS, together with electronic warfare, operational security, physical and information attacks on enemy information processes, and deception, make up information warfare. See Brian Nichiporuk, “U.S. Military Opportunities: Information-Warfare Concepts of Operation,” in Zalmay Khalilzad, John White, and Andy W. Marshall eds. Strategic Appraisal: The Changing Role of Information in Warfare (Santa Monica: RAND Corporation, 1990), p. 180. Information operations and PSYOPs, according to the U.S. military and NATO, seek to “create desired effects on the will, understanding and capability” of enemies and potential adversaries. See Major Rob Sentse and Major Arno Storm, “The Battle for the Information Domain,” IO Journal (2010), p. 7. b This is the author’s assessment based on an in-depth review of al-Shabaab media productions and propaganda messaging since 2007. PSYOPS are particularly attractive for both non-state and state actors because of their lower cost—when compared to costlier ground operations—and potentially high impact on target populations, both friendly and unfriendly. PSYOPS can carry multiple meanings, representing different messaging to different target audiences PSYOPS can also take multiple forms including written leafets or other publications, aural, and audiovisual. See Jeffrey Jones and Michael P. Matthews, “PSYOP and the Warfghting CINC (Commander in Chief),” National Defense University, 1995, p. 29. c PSYOPS are also known as infuence operations. See “Information Operations,” RAND Corporation, and Edward Waltz, Information Warfare: Principles and Operations (Boston: Artech House, 1998). d Al-Shabaab has been able to attract international news media attention— and a broader audience than its propaganda by itself could reach. For example, in its pseudo-documentary-style flm documenting its September 2013 attack on Nairobi’s Westgate Mall, The Westgate Siege: Retributive Justice, the al-Shabaab narrator spent one minute of the one-hour- and-16-minute flm urging Western “lone wolf” terrorists to carry out “Westgate-style” attacks on malls in their own countries including the United States, Canada, France, and the United Kingdom, going so far as to name specifc potential targets. This one-minute-long segment attracted international news media attention. See, for example, Tom Whitehead and Peter Foster, “Extremists call for terror attacks on major London shopping centres,” Telegraph, February 23, 2015; Eric Bradner, “Johnson warns Mall of America patrons,” CNN, February 23, 2015; Faith Karimi, Ashley Fantz, and Catherine E. Shoichet, “Al-Shabaab threatens malls, including some in U.S.; FBI downplays threat,” CNN, February 21, 2015; Ben Candea, Lee Ferran, and Pierre Thomas, “Mall of America Heightens Security After al-Shabab Threat,” ABC News, February 22, 2015; “RCMP investigating Al- Shabab video calling for terrorist attack on West Edmondton Mall,” National Post, February 22, 2015; and “Terror group Al-Shabaab singles out West Edmonton Mall in video calling for attacks on shopping centres,” National Post, February 22, 2015. Addressing the Enemy: Al-Shabaab’s PSYOPS Media Warfare By Christopher Anzalone 30 CTC SENTINEL MARCH 2020 Christopher Anzalone is a visiting scholar at the Ali Vural Ak Cen- ter for Global Islamic Studies at George Mason University. His research focuses on political Islam, religion and violence, and Is- lamist visual culture. He has published extensively on the history, ideology, and media operations of al-Shabaab and runs a research website at ibnsiqilli.com. Follow @IbnSiqilli