Forthcoming in Hypatia Please cite published version 1 Gaslighting, First and Second Order Paul-Mikhail Catapang Podosky UNIVERSITY OF MELBOURNE In what sense does one doubt their understanding of reality when subject to gaslighting? I suggest that an answer to this question depends on the linguistic order at which a gaslighting exchange takes place. This marks a distinction between first order and second order gaslighting. The former occurs when there is disagreement over whether a shared concept applies to some aspect of the world, and where the use of words by a speaker is apt to cause a hearer to doubt her interpretive abilities without doubting the accuracy of her concept. The latter occurs when there is disagreement over which concept should be used in a context, and where the use of words by a speaker is apt to cause a hearer to doubt her interpretive abilities in virtue of doubting the accuracy of her concept. Many cases of second order gaslighting are unintentional: its occurrence often depends on contingent environmental facts. I end the paper by focusing on the distinctive epistemic injustices of second order gaslighting: (1) metalinguistic deprivation, (2) conceptual obscuration, and (3) perspectival subversion. I show how each reliably have sequelae in terms of psychological and practical control.