1 DISABILITY:AJUSTICE-BASED ACCOUNT Jessica Begon jessica.e.begon@durham.ac.uk This is a draft of a paper published in Philosophical Studies. If citing, please use the final, published version (available at: https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s11098-020-01466-3). Abstract: Most people have a clear sense of what they mean by disability, and have little trouble identifying conditions they consider disabling. Yet providing a clear and consistent definition of disability is far from straightforward. Standardly, disability is understood as the restriction in our abilities to perform tasks, as a result of an impairment of normal physical or cognitive human functioning (in combination with our social, political, and environmental context, and our resource share). However, which inabilities matter? We are all restricted by our bodies, and are all incapable of performing some tasks, but most of these inabilities are not considered disabilities. If, then, we are to avoid the category of disability becoming overly broad – and thus politically and practically useless – we need some way of picking out the specific inabilities that are disabling. I argue that our answer should be informed by an account of the opportunities individuals are entitled to be able to perform as a matter of justice. Thus, to be disabled is to have these opportunities restricted, and not to deviate from the species norm or lack any ability that might improve our well-being. 1. The Problem of Defining Disability My goal is to defend a new account of disability: one that is indexed to an account of distributive justice, or what individuals are entitled to. Yet it may seem that determining how disability should be defined needs no further investigation. Most people have a clear sense of which conditions they consider disabling. Further, there is broad philosophical consensus on some central features of an account of disability. First, there is a widely accepted distinction between impairment as physical or cognitive features that cause deviation from a biological or statistical norm of species functioning, and disability as a restriction in our ability to perform tasks. 1 There is considerable agreement, too, that 1 For example: Terzi 2004; Nussbaum 2006; Shakespeare 2006; Smith 2001; Buchanan et al. 2000; Oliver 1996. Though some recent work questions this distinction (Barnes 2018; 2016a).