In: White House Studies ISSN: 1535-4738 Volume 10, Number 4 © 2011 Nova Science Publishers, Inc. THE ROOSEVELTIAN TRADITION: THEODORE ROOSEVELT , WOODROW WILSON, AND GEORGE W. BUSH Thomas Bruscino ABSTRACT One of the great fallacies of the post September 11 world is that after that fateful day President George W. Bush reinvented himself as the Woodrow Wilson of the Republican Party. Where he had once mocked the Democratic Party‘s Wilsonian liberal internationalism, he now became the Wilsonian-in-Chief, and the United States subsequently found itself intervening in places like Afghanistan and Iraq. The truth is that the Bush Administration‘s foreign policy after September 11 became much more akin to one of Wilson's predecessors: Theodore Roosevelt. This paper will explore the Rooseveltian and Wilsonian traditions, discuss George W. Bush‘s relationship to both, and explain how the oversimplification of such traditions can lead to a poverty of options in American foreign policy. INTRODUCTION A full decade into the twenty-first century and almost two decades since the end of the Cold War, and in many ways the United States still seems lost in its effort to find coherent guidance for its foreign policy. It is no surprise that American policy makers, pundits, and scholars turn to the past for guidance, and in so doing often find Woodrow Wilson waiting to provide lessons. But in his time, Wilson had to share the stage with another great figure in American history. Theodore Roosevelt‘s lessons are not as clear cut, but they are maybe even more important. This paper will explore some of the differences between the Wilsonian and Rooseveltian foreign policy traditions, discuss George W. Bush‘s relationship to both, and explain how the oversimplification of such traditions can lead to a poverty of options in American foreign policy. Wading into a field like his should be done with some trepidation. All American presidents produce reams of statements and ideas on what they think of the world. Theodore Roosevelt and Woodrow Wilson were both writers, and they produced more than most. In both cases, their ideas changed over time. In both cases, changing contexts drove individual decisions as much or more than following a coherent and complete theory of international relations or foreign policy [1]. For those reasons alone simple statements of their respective philosophies of foreign policy will not suffice. That is why we can safely follow biographer