Studies in Conflict & Terrorism, 35:113–134, 2012 Copyright © Taylor & Francis Group, LLC ISSN: 1057-610X print / 1521-0731 online DOI: 10.1080/1057610X.2012.639061 Finding the Target, Fixing the Method: Methodological Tensions in Insurgent Identification MATTHEW CHARLES FORD Department of Politics and International Studies University of Hull Hull, UK This article is concerned with exploring the recent observations of Lieutenant-General Lamb who stated that there was no simple binary between counterintelligence (COIN) and counterterrorism (CT). Specifically, the article will use the intelligence-gathering, assessment, and target identification processes and methods used on operations in Iraq and Afghanistan to examine this further. What makes this an interesting exercise is that the effectiveness of a COIN/CT intervention totally depends on whether an insurgent has been properly identified. If the wrong person has been targeted then kinetic, influence, or policing activities are at best exploratory and at worst wasteful or even positively harmful. Thus, by investigating the intelligence model that frames the way adversaries and communities are identified, it becomes possible to understand the limitations in the processes and methods used. At the same time this approach makes it possible to cast light on how and to what extent various techniques drawn from COIN and CT work together in Overseas Contingency Operations. There’s a debate in the White House about whether it’s Counter-Terrorism or COIN. It’s all of the above. It always has been it always will be and when people try and apply a binary or a simplicity to what is enormous complexity ... this is a confusion ... it is not either or. ... —Lieutenant-General Sir Graeme Lamb 1 The decision in 2009 by the Obama administration to use the phrase “Overseas Contingency Operations” instead of the “Global War on Terror” or “the Long War” does not simply represent a relabeling exercise. 2 Instead, this new language points to the emergence of military practices that are the product of Coalition and International Security and Assistance Force (ISAF) efforts to defeat insurgencies and Al Qaeda in Iraq and Afghanistan. These practices do not emphasize global Counter Insurgency (COIN) over Counterterrorism (CT) but more accurately represents a certain blending of the two techniques in a manner that reflects the U.S. military’s large-scale troop deployments on operations overseas. The notion that COIN and CT techniques are blending on overseas operations contrasts with contemporary academic discussions that have typically sought to emphasize how the Received 27 March 2011; accepted 6 September 2011. Address correspondence to Dr. Matthew Charles Ford, Department of Politics and International Studies, University of Hull, Hull, UK HU6 7RX. E-mail: m.ford@hull.ac.uk 113 Downloaded by [King's College London] at 08:10 19 January 2012