Pamies, A.; Iñesta Mena, E.M. (1999). Some cross-linguistic Observations on phraseology: the expression of injustice. En L. Mešková (Ed.), Acta Linguistica, 3 (pp. 23-32). Banskej Bystrici, Eslovaquia: Univerzity Mateja Bela v Banskej Bystrici ISBN: 80-8055-332-7. SOME CROSS-LINGUISTIC OBSERVATIONS ON PHRASEOLOGY: THE EXPRESSION OF INJUSTICE Antonio Pamies Eva Iñesta University of Granada In comparison with the universality that can be attributed to meanings like MOVE, FEEL, etc., the concept of INJUSTICE tends to be much more language specific as it is subject to important historical and ideological variations, and thus more marked culturally speaking. The concept of INJUSTICE cannot be “defined by itself” as the universal semantic primes can, because of the inherent instability of its own subjectiveness. Nevertheless, there are some interesting coincidences and divergences that languages reflect through certain lexical units, especially idioms, that presuppose the existence of some values linked to this concept, as, for example, in the case of idioms expressing the idea TO ACCUSE SOMEONE OF A CRIME HE HAS NOT COMMITTED, where the target domain is a complex condensing several facts and evaluations. <1> A SAYS THAT B DID Z <2> Z IS SOMETHING BAD <3> B DID NOT DO Z Though the value and truth judgements alter in different communities and epochs, such judgements always exist, and this provides us a basis for not ruling out the possible universality of this global meaning by itself, though -naturally- it cannot be considered as a “prime”. On the other hand, its basic components (SAY, DO, BAD) are included in the list of empirically attested semantic universals according to Wierzbicka, who considers them as predicates that can be combined, providing the very bases of moral and law (cf. Wierzbicka 1993). Actions can be imputed to anyone and be considered as “bad”, anyplace and anywhere, and they may also not correspond to the real state of things; such falsehood can in turn be considered as something negative (at least by the victim). In the following idioms, where an innocent is deliberately accused there are abundant images like “to throw something at someone” or “place something upon someone”, that is, spatial and kinetic metaphors. From the internal point of view, the mechanisms that generate those metaphors are quite similar, especially in Indo-European languages. Guilt is represented as something solid and heavy, some other times guilt is explicitly mentioned, but linked to verbs usually related with concrete and heavy objects, directly associated with the idea of “loading” (for example, in legal terminology an indictment is called “a charge” 1 ). GUILT is not a prime element either, but it can easily be split up as CAUSING SOMETHING BAD , though in order to abbreviate the descriptor GUILT can be used once this explanation has been given 2 . Therefore we have got several iconic models based on the source-domain [SPACE]+[MOVEMENT] . The simplest version is the metonymy that identifies guilt with a deed and afterwards superimposes a metaphor representing this deed as a load: eng. to charge someone with something eng. to put it on someone There is another possibility for combining the same source-domains ([SPACE]+[MOVEMENT]): GUILT can be mentioned without metaphor but it is still represented as something that one drops, or even throws, at the other person. eng. to lay the blame on someone to place the blame on someone 1 In Spanish legal terminology, it is called “cargo” (“a charge”), whose etymology is “I load”. 2 We are not referring here to “feeling guilty”, which in Spanish can be used with the sa me (polysemic) word (culpa).