Keys Presence of Non-Euro-Mediterranean Actors in the Mediterranean IEMed. Mediterranean Yearbook 2018 53 Presence of Non-Euro-Mediterranean Actors in the Mediterranean Gulf Rivalries Reach North Africa Eduard Soler i Lecha Senior Researcher at CIDOB, Barcelona Scientific Coordinator of the MENARA Project The imprint of the Gulf countries is very visible in North Africa. And not only in terms of millionaire investments, as we had grown accustomed to thinking. The geopolitical competition between them is increasingly blatant and stark, and any situ- ation will do to gain influence or try to snatch it from a rival. In the 1990s, it was said that the dynamics of con- flict and cooperation in the Maghreb were increas- ingly independent of what was happening in the rest of the Arab world. Alliances and counter-alliances were shaped by the historic rivalry between Algeria and Morocco, not the conflicts of the Middle East; the countries of the Maghreb increasingly looked to Europe or Africa; and regional powers, such as Tur- key, Israel or the Gulf countries themselves did not seem to pay too much attention to what happened there. It may not have been a minor issue, but it was a secondary one. This began to change in 2011, when a wave of pro- tests that would shake the foundations of the pre- existing order began in Tunisia. Both the estab- lished regional powers and those that aspired to move up the ladder, such as Qatar or the Emirates, understood that new opportunities, as well as new risks, were emerging in North Africa. The biggest bets were placed in Egypt, the centre of gravity of the Arab world and North Africa’s most populous country. The Gulf’s influence was also felt in the Tu- nisian transition and the Libyan conflict. At the same time, the countries of North Africa in- creasingly had no choice but to position them- selves with regard to the rivalries between the Gulf countries. The clearest case was the boycott of Qatar, but the war in Yemen is equally important, as well as all things related to Iran, a highly sensitive issue for Riyadh and Abu Dhabi. An eloquent sign of just how connected the geopolitical dynamics of the Gulf and North Africa are was Morocco’s deci- sion, in May 2018, to cut off diplomatic relations with Iran, after accusing Teheran of supporting the Polisario Front through Hezbollah. As this article will explain, while this may have been the most re- cent case, and one of the most striking, it was hard- ly the only one. Egypt: The Lifeline The political changes in Egypt have immediately been reflected in its relations with the Gulf coun- tries. Whilst Saudi Arabia positioned itself as one of the countries most favourable to Mubarak remaining in power, Qatar quickly bet on his fall. With the rise of the Muslim Brotherhood, the Qatari landing ma- terialized, amongst other things, in the form of an exponential increase in investment – more than 1,000%, coupled with the promise of another $18 billion in the years to come. 1 More clear proof of the Qatari support could be found in the repeated injec- tions of capital in the form of aid: some $8 billion in a total of three payments. The last payment was pre- ceded by a meeting between senior officials from both cabinets that ended with statements by the then-Qatari Prime Minister Sheikh Hamad bin Jas- 1 CENTRAL BANK OF EGYPT (CBE). Monthly Statistical Bulletin, 249. Available at: www.cbe.org.eg/en/EconomicResearch/Publications/Pages/ MonthlyBulletinHistorical.aspx (retrieved: 23 May 2018).