STOIC PRACTICAL PHILOSOPHY IN THE IMPERIAL PERIOD JOHN SELLARS In what follows what I hope to do is to show the way in which the idea of a philosophical exercise played an important role in the understanding of philosophy in late Stoicism. 1 I should stress that my reconstruction – drawing on material from a range of sources – is inevitably somewhat speculative. I should also note that although what I have to say will on the surface look quite similar to what Pierre Hadot has said about spiritual exercises in ancient philosophy, there are some important differences between his account and mine. 2 Finally, I should make clear at the outset that the significance of the account I am about to give about philosophical exercises in late Stoicism is due to the way in which it enables us to approach certain late Stoic texts – in particular Epictetus’ Handbook and Marcus Aurelius’ Meditations – in a new light and consequently to re-assess their philosophical significance. Introduction For many modern philosophers, philosophy of often understood as an activity devoted to developing a rational understanding of the world and to testing one’s pre-existing beliefs to see if they stand up to rational scrutiny. While it seems fairly obvious that altering one’s beliefs about the world should have at least some impact on the way in which one lives in that world, many modern philosophers tend to shy away from the thought that what they do will impact on their way of life. One might say that they still think under the shadow of Hume’s famous thought that there is no reason why our epistemological speculations should impact upon the way we play back-gammon. 3 All this would have horrified Socrates, of course, who in Plato’s Apology is presented as being primarily concerned with examining his own life and the lives of his fellow Athenians. Indeed, throughout ancient philosophy one can find references to suggest that philosophy was often thought of as a matter of actions rather than words. This idea of an individual’s beliefs being a matter of ‘deeds not words’ (erga ou logoi) first became prominent in fifth- and fourth- century Athens and, in particular, was associated with Socrates, forming part of 1 The material in this article draws upon work previously published in J. Sellars, The art of living: The Stoics on the nature and function of philosophy (Aldershot 2003), with various modifications, and hopefully some improvements and clarifications. I would like to thank the publisher Ashgate for permission to reproduce here. I would also like to thank both Richard Sorabji and Miriam Griffin for some helpful written comments on an earlier draft. 2 For an account of these differences see Sellars, The art of living (n. 1 above) 115-18. In brief, Hadot claims that ancient philosophy itself was a spiritual exercise, whereas I claim such exercises were just one part of ancient philosophy, alongside rational discourse. 3 See D. Hume, A treatise of human nature (Oxford 1978) 269.