1 [Forthcoming in Ch. Damböck and A. T. Tuboly (Eds.), The Socio-Ethical Dimension of Knowledge: The Mission of Logical Empiricism. Vienna Circle Institute Yearbook. Cham: Springer. Forthcoming in 2020.] Schlick on the meaning of “good” Gergely Ambrus Eötvös University, Institute of Philosophy ambrus.gergely@btk.elte.hu Abstract The paper discusses Schlick’s Fragen der Ethik. It comprises of two parts. The first part analyses Schlick’s metaethical views, his arguments against objective values and absolute norms, and his analysis of the meaning of “good” in general and “morally good” in particular. Further, it also tests these views against some plausible objections. The second part addresses an apparent tension in Schlick’s conception. The underl ying general thesis of the Fragen der Ethik is that philosophical ethics is an exclusively descriptive, non-normative endeavour: philosophy ought not aim at proving what the good is, which norms are objectively valid. Justification of values or norms may only consist in determining whether they are endorsed, judged as values or norms by a particular society. This is, however, the task of scientific ethics, i.e. empirical scientific research. In contrast with this proclaimed view, Schlick in the last chapter of the book also puts forth his own normative ethical views, i.e. his Principle of Happiness – apparently leaving the role of the moral philosopher and moral scientist behind and acting as a moralist. Moreover, it seems, that he relies on this normative principle to ground his analysis of the meaning of “morally good”. I suggest that this tension may be dissolved by turning to Schlick’s antropology. One important characteristic of this antropology is that humans by nature have altruistic inclinations, and this grounds that individuals may genuinely desire the welfare of society. This is supported by empirical observations, according to Schlick, hence a legitimate scientific ethical claim. But there is also another, more interesting and unique characteristic: Schlick seems to preserve elements of his earlier ethical views, he put forth in Lebensweisheit (1908) and in Vom Sinn des Lebens (1927), i.e. his Schillerian antropology, according to which the essence of humanity is playing. For according to Schlick’s proposed “ethics of kindness” the ethics of desire and the ethics of demand may be synthesized by the ethics of love: acting morally means acting freely, without coercion, that is, acting playfully, in accordance with the essence of human nature. So our altruisitic inclinations may be nurtured by Schillerian aesthetic-moral education. XY.1. Introduction Moritz Schlick’s book, the Problems of Ethics shares the fate of G.E. Moore’s Principia Ethica in a certain respect: only its first, introductory chapter became known for a wider public (by being republished in the influential collection of Ayer (1959) on Logical Positivism), and, the content of the rest of book fell into oblivion, except perhaps for a few historians of philosophy specialized in Schlick or in 20th century ethics (see e.g. Siegetsleitner 2014, pp. 265-331; Mormann 2010; Iven 2006a, 2006b). 1 However, a reconstruction of Schlick’s ethical views 1 This is perhaps a bit of an exaggeration, since in the German-speaking philosophical community Schlick’s work is better-known and has been discussed; see e.g. Hegselmann’s introduction to the German reprint of the book (Hegselmann 1984), Heiner Rutte’s “Ethics and the Problem of Value in the Vienna Circle” (Rutte 1991), Matthias Iven’s “Editorischer Bericht” to the Fragen der Ethik (Iven 2006b), and Anna Siegetsleitner’s works on Schlick’s ethics (Siegetsleitner 2010; 2014, pp. 265-331). Also, a fairly recent development in the English reception is that