1 Corpses, Seeds, and Statues: Potentiality and possibility in Aristotle’s Metaphysics IX and De Interpretatione Mary Katrina Krizan It is taken as a given possibility and potentiality are different notions for Aristotle. Some commentators argue that possibility and capacity are related by a biconditional for Aristotle, while others have suggested that one is neither necessary nor sufficient for the other. In this paper, I suggest that potentiality is necessary but not sufficient for possibility. This interpretation is not subject to the same problems and counterexamples as the other two interpretations; likewise, it is consistent with Aristotle’s theory of generation and corruption. I. Aristotle distinguishes between potentiality and possibility, although the nature of this distinction is less than clear. In this paper, I deal solely with a restricted reading of both potentiality and possibility, analyzing the relation between ‘x is possibly F’ and ‘x is potentially F.’ 1 There are four plausible ways that potentiality and possibility could be related: (1) potentiality and possibility are related by a biconditional, that is, potentiality implies possibility and possibility implies potentiality; (2) potentiality and possibility are not related by a biconditional, that is, potentiality does not imply possibility, and possibility does not imply potentiality; (3) possibility is necessary but not sufficient for potentiality; and (4) potentiality is necessary but not sufficient for possibility. 2 (1)-(3) all fail on the restricted reading, as Aristotle is committed to ‘possibility implies capacity,’ but not ‘capacity implies possibility.’ 1 This is the same restricted reading that is observed in most literature on the topic. 2 It should be noted that this restricted interpretation avoids questions such as whether or not there can be potentialities for events as well as objects and whether matter can have a capacity to be generated or destroyed in a