Preliminary communication UDC 165(045) 1 Rorty, R. doi: 10.21464/sp35111 Received: 8 March 2019 Boško Pešić, 1 Mislav Uzunić 2 1 University of Osijek, Faculty of Humanities and Social Sciences, Lorenza Jägera 9, HR–31000 Osijek 2 H. D. Genschera 16A, HR–32100 Vinkovci 1 bpesic@ffos.hr, 2 mislavuzunic@gmail.com Rorty’s Metaphilosophy and the Critique of Epistemology Abstract Richard Rorty is a contemporary philosopher of analytic philosophical tradition who shif- ted his career to a metaphilosophical critique of epistemology. The basis for Rorty’s critique lies in his rejection of Cartesian dualism, which leads him to a conclusion that every attempt at achieving truth by the way of knowing essences is destined for failure. Instead, Rorty argues for a search for understanding via conversation – a process which he called edifca- tion – and which would lead to the elimination of the epistemological problem of knowledge altogether. His metaphilosophical endeavor wants hermeneutics to supplant epistemology and become the fundamental philosophical approach. However, Rorty underemphasizes the importance of truth for hermeneutics, a defciency of his which the paper will try to amend in order to show that Rorty’s skepticism regarding truth makes it problematic for his position to claim rapport with hermeneutics. After detailing Rorty’s metaphilosophical programme, which was mainly established in Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, the paper will explore the (in)compatibility of his position with hermeneutics, most notably with Gadamer’s. This leads to the conclusion that it would be a mistake to consider Rorty’s (meta)philosophy as an offshoot of hermeneutics or being completely compatible with it, considering he gives primacy to social problems over truth. Keywords Richard Rorty, metaphilosophy, hermeneutics, epistemology, edifcation, truth Introduction Richard Rorty is a contemporary American thinker who originated from the so-called analytic philosophical tradition. Rorty’s approach to criticizing phi- losophy and philosophical tradition is primarily a metaphilosophical endeav- our stemming from his neopragmatism and anti-Platonism. With his most prominent and, by some interpreters, the most controversial work titled Phi- losophy and the Mirror of Nature, frst published in 1979, Rorty had turned against the tradition he came from, which granted him the title of “anti-phil- osophical philosopher” among his critics. Rorty’s main thesis is that knowl- edge is ultimately unattainable, especially within epistemology which grew on the foundations of Cartesian dualism. His criticism is twofold: Rorty frst tries to prove that there is no such thing as mind as the “mirror of nature”, and then he tries to show that there is no such thing as universal language which functions as a conduit for knowledge. Such premises impose a conclusion that any attempt at attaining knowledge should be discarded and then supplanted by a search for understanding as the man’s fundamental mode of interaction. In this regard, Rorty considers hermeneutics as the counterpart to epistemol- ogy and an ally because it has, since its very beginning, been careful when discussing the problem of knowledge, placing primacy on understanding in-