https://doi.org/10.1177/0275074020911783 American Review of Public Administration 2020, Vol. 50(4-5) 375–386 © The Author(s) 2020 Article reuse guidelines: sagepub.com/journals-permissions DOI: 10.1177/0275074020911783 journals.sagepub.com/home/arp Article The Bureau of Land Management (BLM) has and continues to face multiple challenges to its activities. The lack of a con- sensus over the federal purpose of the lands managed by the BLM presents a main and continuing thread of ambiguity (Skillen, 2008). Environmentalism and management goals have eroded the original resource conservationism of the beginning of the 20th century. However, perhaps more importantly, these changing perceptions of the purpose and intent of public lands policy has led to federal land resource agencies focusing on planning. For the BLM, the first requirement of the Federal Land Policy and Management Act (FLPMA), the participation of vested interests in the planning process, takes on a primary role. A role that, accord- ing to Skillen (2008), has and continues to become increas- ingly cross-jurisdictional, collaborative, site specific, and court mediated. The formulation of land use plans, from a management point of view, is the most important task assigned to the BLM (“Interest Representation and the Federal Land Policy and Management Act,” 1982). The BLM, under the multiple use sustained yield principle that serves as Congress’ primary directive to the agency, faces almost no significant limitation on its discretion. The Multiple Use Sustained Yield Act of 1960 is the source of this principle, and its efficacy both in terms of administrative policy and as a check on BLM dis- cretion has and remains in contention. It remains in contention as its underlying assumption relies on replacing clear standards for broad public participation. “Despite this mandate, Congress has failed to set clear standards about the nature of participation envisioned or its place in public decision-making” (“Interest Representation and the Federal Land Policy and Management Act,” 1982, pp. 1312–1313). Although the act provides a procedural basis for addressing federal land management, it does not provide a clear basis for addressing the ideological differences in how the actions of the BLM will be perceived by actors with different ideologi- cal foundations. The main question this article seeks to address is how the BLM’s bureaucratic autonomy is affected by deep ideologi- cal divides over land management policy. Bureaucratic autonomy is defined by Daniel Carpenter (2001) as occur- ring “when bureaucrats take actions consistent with their own wishes, actions to which politicians and organized inter- ests defer even though they would prefer that other actions (or no action at all) be taken” (p. 4). This is, in essence, a discussion within the larger category of administrative 911783ARP XX X 10.1177/0275074020911783The American Review of Public AdministrationMalay and Fairholm research-article 2020 1 University of South Dakota, Vermillion, USA Corresponding Author: Joshua Malay, University of South Dakota, 414 E. Clark St., DH 119, Vermillion, SD 57069, USA. Email: malayjoshua@gmail.com How Ideological Divides Serve to Limit Bureaucratic Autonomy: A Case Study of the BLM Joshua Malay 1 and Matthew R. Fairholm 1 Abstract The main question this article seeks to address is how the Bureau of Land Management’s (BLM) bureaucratic autonomy is affected by deep ideological divides over public lands management policy. Daniel Carpenter’s theory of bureaucratic autonomy serves to provide the definition and method for evaluating the research question. The case study identifies that the bureaucratic autonomy afforded the BLM is intrinsically bound to interest group politics. There exists little room for initiative not supported by specific interests. Actions required by the multiple use mandate, but not supported by interests, will be suppressed. But, of greater interest in understanding the BLM, once support shifts for an initiative, all previous action is undone or at least mitigated to a point of inconsequence. Hence, limited bureaucratic autonomy is afforded either way, as the multiple use requirement will not satisfy all parties and does not allow the BLM to ignore other potential uses of the public lands. Keywords bureaucratic legitimacy, interest group politics, bureaucratic autonomy, administrative discretion, Bureau of Land Management, public lands management