DISCUSSION NOTE What Counts as “Success” in Speculative and Anticipatory Ethics? Lessons from the Advent of Germline Gene Editing Ari Schick # Springer Nature B.V. 2019 Abstract This discussion note offers a preliminary anal- ysis of what recent developments in human germline gene editing tell us about the effectiveness of speculative and anticipatory modes of techno-ethics. It argues that the benefits of speculative discussions are difficult to detect thus far, and that pushing the focal point of ethical dis- course well ahead of the current state of technology may prematurely undermine existing norms long before a broad consensus would justify moving beyond them. Keywords Speculative ethics . Anticipatory bioethics . Bioethics . Gene editing . Genetic engineering . Regulation Introduction One element uniting the varied discourses subsumed under the heading of “techno-ethics” (e.g., bioethics, neuroethics, nanoethics, AI ethics) is that each incorpo- rates anticipatory discussions based on speculations about the future. As much as we may be concerned with the moral dimensions of current technologies, possibil- ities appearing on the horizon and their ethical implica- tions command attention—particularly when the antici- pated technologies in question are imagined to be so- cially disruptive or transformative. Socio-technical speculation, once characteristic of utopian imaginings and fodder for philosophical thought experiments, is now pursued as a form of moral foresight; an attempt to keep the ethical discourse ahead of the technological curve and guide society toward morally sound decisions regarding emerging technologies. Given the intuitive appeal of this kind of proactive ethical deliberation, it is understandable that even in fields such as bioethics, where there is no lack of pressing current issues, spec- ulative discussions have become quite prominent. Critics have pointed out that the appeal of speculative techno-ethics obscures a number of fundamental pitfalls (explored in depth in the inaugural issue of this journal) [1, 2], including its doubtful effectiveness in light of the Collingridge dilemma, 1 its tendency to reinforce rather than question the visions and values underlying techno- scientific research programs [5], and the degree to which it shifts intellectual resources away from more pressing https://doi.org/10.1007/s11569-019-00350-7 1 The problem identified by David Collingridge is that attempts to control the social effects of a new technology face an inverse relation- ship between knowledge and agency. When a technology is new it may be easy to implement policies to control it, but we do not yet know what its problematic effects are; once it does come into wide use and negative social consequences become apparent, implementing effec- tive policy responses becomes far more difficult [3]. Although some have claimed that speculative ethics can prepare society to respond (just in case a given technology produces the very effects that ethicists anticipate) [4], there is no evidence that this would be any more effective than an incrementalist approach that is responsive to technol- ogies as they are developed and come into use. To be clear, this does not bear on the work of ethicists working on upstream development processes (such as engineering moral values into AI systems), but this has not been an approach taken within speculative bioethics, which usually asks what we ought to do with a given technology once it arrives. A. Schick (*) Polonsky Library, Van Leer Jerusalem Institute, 43 Jabotinsky Street, 9214116 Jerusalem, Israel e-mail: aschick@gmail.com Nanoethics (2019) 13:261–267 Received: 24 April 2019 /Accepted: 27 October 2019 /Published online: 22 November 2019