62 Middle East Policy, Vol. XXVI, No. 3, Fall 2019 © 2019, The Author Middle East Policy © 2019, Middle East Policy Council From Defense to Offense: Realist Shifts in Saudi Foreign Policy Ben Rich and Kylie Moore-Gilbert Dr. Rich is a lecturer in international relations at Curtin University in Perth, Australia. Dr. Moore-Gilbert is a lecturer in Islamic Studies at the University of Melbourne. S ince the 2015 ascension of King Salman bin Abdulaziz, the Saudi state has displayed growing discontinuity with trends in its pursuit of national security. Over the past four years, the kingdom has shifted from being a source of comparative stability and continuity in the Persian Gulf security equation to a disposition that is disruptive to that system. Having initiated a series of destabilizing crises throughout the Middle East, the Saudi pursuit of external security appears no longer defned by the predict- ability that has been its hallmark since its inception. Instead, it appears increasingly characterized by unpredictable aggres- siveness. As one veteran Saudi analyst has argued, anticipating the kingdom’s next foreign-policy move has become more challenging than Soviet watching during the height of the Cold War. In interpreting paradigm shifts such as these, it is often prudent to return to a discipline’s basic assumptions, to ascertain whether they ofer analytical value. In this regard, I ask whether diferent strands of realism help explain recent developments in Saudi international behavior. I argue that the transformation of the past four years can best be understood as an abandonment of defensive precepts in favor of ofensive realism — particularly applicable to the kingdom, where a zero-sum, nonideologi- cal mentality has always been seen as key to regime survival. At the same time, lib- eral ideals such as regional integration and international institutionalization, as well as the promotion of human rights, economic freedom and political participation, have been eschewed when they have not served an instrumental purpose. 1 While these fac- tors are often acknowledged in passing, the vast majority of discussions concerning Saudi behavior beyond its own borders avoid signifcant theory-guided analysis, opting for more historical and materialist approaches, 2 while only touching on selec- tive components of international relations theory. POWER AND SECURITY This paper repeatedly uses the terms “power maximization,” in the case of of- fensive realism, and “security seeking” in the case of defensive realism, to describe the goals of distinct periods of Saudi for- eign policy. I employ a modifed form of Dahl’s 1957 defnition of power as the