Article A perfectionist basic structure Avigail Ferdman Freie Universita ¨ t Berlin, Germany Abstract When philosophers talk about perfectionism, it is usually as a view of well-being, of developing characteristically human capacities. Yet perfectionism can also be a normative account of what we owe to each other. This article argues that perfectionists have reason to endorse a perfectionist basic structure such that enables persons to develop and exercise their human capacities in meaningful ways. This basic structure has two complementary features: First, it enables a diversity of life experiences. Second, it provides a spatial opportunity structure that creates open-minded environments. Absent these features, rich or lucky individuals gain an unfair advantage in the sphere of opportunities for developing their capacities in meaningful ways. Keywords perfectionism, basic structure, human capacities, objective-list, opportunities When philosophers talk about perfectionism, the perfectionism they are talking about is usually as a view of well-being, of developing characteristically human capacities. Yet perfectionism can also be a normative account of what we have reason to do and about what we owe to each other. As a normative account, perfectionism tells us that we have authoritative reason to perfect ourselves, that is, to develop and exercise our human capacities. This authoritative reason also acts as a reason for each person to help others perfect themselves. In this article, I analyse perfectionism as a moral problem, in relation to the question of what we owe each other. My goal, it should be stressed from the outset, is not to defend perfectionism as an account of well-being. It is, instead, to claim that those who already endorse perfectionism also ought to endorse a perfectionist ‘basic structure of society’, because the basic structure determines how we develop and exercise our human capacities. While the concept of the ‘basic structure’ has been discussed almost Corresponding author: Avigail Ferdman, Institute of Philosophy, Freie Universita ¨t Berlin, Thielallee 43, Berlin 14194, Germany. Email: avigail.ferdman@fu-berlin.de Philosophy and Social Criticism 2019, Vol. 45(7) 862–882 ª The Author(s) 2019 Article reuse guidelines: sagepub.com/journals-permissions DOI: 10.1177/0191453718820891 journals.sagepub.com/home/psc