THE PLACE OF LOGIC IN PRAGMATISM 1 Ahti-Veikko Pietarinen, ahti-veikko.pietarinen@helsinki.fi Department of Philosophy, University of Helsinki 31.8. 2008 Abstract This paper argues that the tendency in contemporary discussion to neglect the logical roots of pragmatistic philosophy is a symptom of taking language as a universal medium of expression. My thesis is that the two presuppositions concerning the role of logic in pragmatism, universalism and its denial of calculism, delineate two kinds of pragmatisms, pragmatism and pragmaticism. I conclude that the latter, which was Peirce’s original formulation, is methodologically the more tolerant of the two and hence embraces pluralism over and above pragmatism. Key words: Pragmatism, pragmaticism, logic, universalism, calculism, Peirce. 1. Introduction: Logic and Pragmatism According to Max Meyer’s dictum, which was replicated by F. C. S. Schiller and countless others over the early years of pragmatism, “there are as many pragmatisms as there are pragmatists” (Meyer 1908: 326). This phrase was kidnapped by both the proponents and the antagonists of the movement. Bertrand Russell used it to ridicule the idea that pragmatism was to be taken seriously at all, while Charles W. Morris took it to welcome the fruitfulness and open-mindedness of the approach. We are probably well-advised not to agree with either of these extremities, as both were changing their opinions so many times 1 Supported by the University of Helsinki Excellence in Research Grant (Peirce’s Pragmatistic Philosophy and Its Applications, Principal Investigator A.-V. Pietarinen). My thanks to the organisers and participants of the following conferences in which I presented earlier versions: Pragmatism: Salient Inquirers, Cluj-Napoca, September 2007; The 10 th International Meeting on Pragmatism, São Paulo, November 2007; The First Nordic Pragmatism Conference, Helsinki, June 2008, and the Peirce Society Session at the World Congress of Philosophy, Seoul, August 2008.