Faking propensity and faking-related change: A model-based analysis of the EPQ-R scores Pere J. Ferrando ⇑ , Cristina Anguiano-Carrasco Research Centre for Behavioural Assessment (CRAMC), ‘Rovira i Virgili’ University, Spain article info Article history: Received 16 December 2010 Received in revised form 27 April 2011 Available online 1 June 2011 Keywords: Eysenck Personality Questionnaire Revised (EPQ-R) Change scores Social desirability Instructed faking Two-group two-wave models abstract Although change scores in a measure administered under neutral and faking-motivating conditions have become a main choice to operationalize faking, there are still some non-resolved issues on the results they provide. The present study uses a two-wave two-group design with a control group to assess three of these issues: (a) the role of individual differences in the amount of faking-induced change, (b) the rela- tion between Impression Management (IM) scores under neutral conditions and change scores, and (c) the convergent validity of change scores as a requisite to view them as measures of an individual- difference variable. A Spanish translation of the Eysenck Personality Questionnaire Revised was admin- istered twice to 489 undergraduate students under standard–standard instructions (N = 215) and under standard-faking-good instructions (N = 274). For the P, N, and Lie scales, the results showed that the role of individual differences was very relevant and that the only common variable underlying the scores was a general factor of faking-induced change. However, the IM scores were unable to predict effective change. Ó 2011 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved. 1. Introduction Faking good can be conceptualized as an individual’s deliberate attempt to manipulate responses to psychological instruments, un- der motivated conditions, in order to create a positive impression (e.g., Furnham, 1986; Griffith & Peterson, 2008; McFarland & Ryan, 2006; Zickar & Robie, 1999). At present this concept is generally operationalized by using two main approaches (Griffith & Peterson, 2008; McFarland & Ryan, 2006). The first is to use scores on a detection scale. The second is to use change or difference scores in a measure administered under neutral and faking-motivating conditions. Although the second approach has been used for many decades (e.g. Eysenck & Eysenck, 1963), it started to become more popular in the 1990s as interest in the use of personality measures in selection began to increase again (Griffith & Peterson, 2008; McFarland & Ryan, 2006). The detection-based approach has mainly focused on the Impres- sion Management component (IM; Paulhus, 1991) of social desir- ability (McFarland & Ryan, 2006; Mersman & Shultz, 1998): a conscious tendency by respondents to tailor their answers so as to create a more positive image. As faking-related measures, some authors (e.g. Eysenck & Eysenck, 1976; Furnham, 1986) have interpreted IM scores in two-ways. When administered under faking-motivating conditions they are thought to behave as detec- tion measures. So, in one sense, they reflect the consequences of fak- ing. When administered under neutral conditions, however, they are thought to measure a substantive personality variable (e.g. Furn- ham, 1986; McFarland & Ryan, 2006). However, this second view is controversial (e.g. Holden & Passey, 2010) and there is no consen- sus among its advocates on how this hypothetical variable should be understood. Some authors (Ferrando & Anguiano-Carrasco 2011; McFarland & Ryan, 2006) further conjectured that it might be con- ceptualized as a propensity to fake good. Even if this were so, how- ever, it is not clear to what extent the initial levels in this variable can predict effective change under faking-motivating conditions. Unlike the detection-based strategy, change scores are direct and have obvious face validity. However, they also have potential short- comings that must be addressed if results are to be interpretable. To start with, there are two basic problems. First, changes might be ctotally or partially due to pre-test effects rather than to the changed faking conditions (e.g. Mesmer-Magnus & Viswesvaran, 2006). Sec- ond, the dimensionality and structure of the measure might be dif- ferent under neutral and faking-motivating conditions, which would mean that under faking-motivation conditions, respondents would attach different meanings to the items. That the trait under measure retains the same meaning under both conditions is a logical prerequisite for change scores to be interpreted meaningfully (Rogosa, Brandt, & Zimowski, 1982). In this study we shall use change scores, which we shall inter- pret using parsimonious hypotheses. As for the first problem, we shall assume that there are no pre-test effects. As for the second, we shall adopt the ‘‘theta-shift’’ hypothesis (e.g. Zickar & Robie, 0191-8869/$ - see front matter Ó 2011 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved. doi:10.1016/j.paid.2011.05.006 ⇑ Corresponding author. Address: Universidad ‘Rovira i Virgili’, Facultad de Psicologia, Carretera Valls s/n, 43007 Tarragona, Spain. Tel./fax: +34 977558079. E-mail address: perejoan.ferrando@urv.cat (P.J. Ferrando). Personality and Individual Differences 51 (2011) 497–501 Contents lists available at ScienceDirect Personality and Individual Differences journal homepage: www.elsevier.com/locate/paid