Adolescent Naturalistic Conceptions of Moral Maturity Sam A. Hardy, Brigham Young University, Lawrence J. Walker, University of British Columbia, Joseph A. Olsen, Jonathan E. Skalski, and Jason C. Basinger, Brigham Young University Abstract Understanding lay conceptions of morality is important not only because they can guide moral psychology theory but also because they may play a role in everyday moral functioning. Thus, the purpose of this study was to examine adolescent concep- tions of moral maturity. Study 1 (200 adolescents 12–18 years) involved a free-listing procedure to generate traits descriptive of a moral person. In Study 2, involving 100 early (11–14 years) and 99 late (15–18 years) adolescents, the moral person traits obtained in the first study were rated in terms of how well they described a moral person. Study 3, with 234 early (10–14 years) and 240 late (15–18 years) adolescents, entailed a similarity-sorting task and a rating procedure similar to that from Study 2. This set of studies uncovered early and late adolescents’ implicit typologies of moral maturity and pointed to possible age similarities and differences. Keywords: moral development; morality; moral personality; adolescence Introduction Moral psychology has failed to accord sufficient attention and credence to people’s ordinary understandings of the domain. Yet such naturalistic conceptions of morality may play a role in everyday moral life and may help guide work on morality. Although our understanding of adult naturalistic conceptions of morality is growing (Lapsley & Lasky, 2001; Smith, Türk Smith, & Christopher, 2007; Walker & Pitts, 1998), we still know little about how such conceptions develop and how they function in adolescence. Thus, the purpose of the present study was to shed light on adolescent conceptions of moral maturity and to examine possible age and gender differences in such conceptions. Moral Person Prototypes (Naturalistic Conceptions of Moral Maturity) Building on social-cognitive theory, recent movements in moral psychology argue that schemas may be at the heart of morality (Lapsley & Narvaez, 2004). One type of schema is a prototype, such as an individual’s mental image of what it means to be a Correspondence should be addressed to Sam A. Hardy, Department of Psychology, Brigham Young University, Provo, UT 84602, USA. Email: sam_hardy@byu.edu doi: 10.1111/j.1467-9507.2010.00590.x © Blackwell Publishing Ltd. 2011. Published by Blackwell Publishing, 9600 Garsington Road, Oxford OX4 2DQ, UK and 350 Main Street, Malden, MA 02148, USA.