Gergely Ambrus Juhos’ Antiphysicalism and his Views on the Psychophysical Problem Introduction In this paper my primary aim is to discuss Bela Juhos’ views on the mind- body problem (or the psychophysical problem, as the logical positivists preferred to call it). In order to achieve this, I find it necessary to provide some background against which his ideas can be located: I shall outline Juhos’ metaphilosophical views on the nature and goal of philosophical inquiry, and the diverse accounts of the psychophysical problem in and around the Vienna Circle. * Juhos, the only member of the Vienna Circle with Hungarian origin, 1 studied mathematics, physics, and philosophy at the University of Vi- enna. In philosophy, he was a student of Schlick, and his views on most issues followed his master’s rather closely. Juhos’ philosophical method was a certain sort of linguistic analysis (“die sprachlogische Methode”), according to which one has to deal with philosophical problems the fol- lowing way. First, one has to clarify the meaning of the concepts used in formulating the philosophical problem and provide them with a new, scientifically acceptable (i.e. verifiable) meaning. Then reformulate the original problem with these new concepts. As a result, the old problem 1 He came from a (possibly Transsylvanian) gentry family, who had a steel business at the turn of the 20th century both in Budapest and Vienna. Bela Juhos himself was born in Budapest and moved to Vienna in 1909, at the age of 8. The psychologist Egon Brunswick, who also had connections with the Vienna Circle, also came from a (historical) Hungarian family. However, the branch of Brunswicks he belonged to, had lived in Vienna for long, so his relations to Hungary may have been rather weak. (This information is due to Csaba Pl´ eh.)