Paloma, F.G. et al.: Incidence of neuroscience on the psychopedagogy… Sport Science, 2 (2009) 1: 7-16 7 INCIDENCE OF NEUROSCIENCE ON THE PSYCHOPEDAGOGY RELATION CORPOREITY/ LEARNING Filippo Gomez Paloma 1 , Nadia Carlomagno 2 , Michela Galdieri 1 , Rosa Sgambelluri 1 , Francesca D’Elia 1 and Maurizio Sibilio 1 1 University of Salerno, Salerno, Italy 2 University of Neaples “Suor Orsola Benincasa”, Neaples, Italy Review paper Abstract The use of Positron Emission Tomography (PET), Functional Magnetic Resonance (fMRI) of Transcranial Magnetic Stimulation (TMS) and Magnetoencephalography (MEG), has allowed to study in depth the functioning of individual neurons or groups of them and has helped to further the knowledge of the central nervous system (particularly the mechanisms by which the brain produces its effects), knowledge that, in the last decade has been a real 'step' forward following the developed capacities of investigation and research through the mentioned new technologies. Nowadays, the experimental research can verify their hypothesis, live and in a non-invasive way, using animals (usually rats and monkeys) and humans (healthy and ‘’clinical’’ pathologic cases). We could say that, on a theoretical level, the development of neuroscience will lead, hopefully, to revising the classic functionalist top-down model, considering the processes in their emerging complexity. For example, it is correct to state that with this, we are facing the overcoming of the primacy of the “intention” on “communication”, as a philosophical mindset that is no longer ante litteram? We answer this question with a reflection that will represent a cultural nature upon which to build the entire study. But the real issue is to clarify what is “mind” for the analysts and what is “consciousness” for scholar of phenomenology and, respectively, what are the “mindset” and what an “act of conscience” is. They are in no way two synonymous. Key words: neuroscience, neurons, knowledge, conscience Introduction The use of Positron Emission Tomography (PET), Functional Magnetic Resonance (fMRI) of Transcranial Magnetic Stimulation (TMS) and Magnetoencephalography (MEG), has allowed to study in depth the functioning of individual neurons or groups of them and has helped to further the knowledge of the central nervous system (particularly the mechanisms by which the brain produces its effects), knowledge that, in the last decade has been a real 'step' forward following the developed capacities of investigation and research through the mentioned new technologies. We could say that, on a theoretical level, the development of neuroscience will lead, hopefully, to revising the classic functionalist top-down model, considering the processes in their emerging complexity. David Hume in his Treatise of Human Nature, in the Anglo-Saxon area with the term ‘mind’, intends the collection of states of mind or functional to human beings, in opposition to the Cartesian dualism and especially to the concept of res cogitans as a thinking substance of an intangible nature. If Descartes supported that the essence of mind is the thought - not “this” or “that” thought, but the thought in generally without content (Cogito), for Hume this is totally unintelligible, because everything that exists is particular and therefore are our different perceptions, with their insuppressible peculiarities, that constitute the mind (Ausubel, 1968). Is the scholar Daniel Dennett (Berthoz, 2000), heir of the Humana tradition that has replaced the “Cartesian theater” of the one flow of consciousness (in which all converge in an orderly and sequential way) with the theory of multiple versions that is multiple channels, in a sort of serials as a functional succession of coalitions of specialized and interconnected circuits? If we reflect and compare on the lived issue of mind-body that informs, now, the almost totality of the contemporary epistemology in the analytical research area, that intersects the cognitive science and neuroscience, we are increasingly distant, to the metaphysical concept of soul that is, in fact, more and more in disuse in the West that has philosophically produced, prepared and articulated it (Buccino et al., 2004). However, the question that we have to ask is: In what measure is a sharing between sensory-motor system of humans and robots needed, so that it is possible to create machines that communicate with us, or that reproduce, simplifying, some characteristics of the cognitive activity of human beings?